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The California Public Records Act: The
Public's Right Of Access To
Governmental Information
The political history of the United States has been characterized by an
ever-increasing expansion of the size and power of government. Count-
less departments, commissions, boards, bureaus, offices, and agencies
have been created by the federal, state, and local governments to carry
out the wide array of governmental functions. The result of this phenom-
enon has been the creation of an immense bureaucracy which accumu-
lates enormous quantities of records and documents. Availability of the
information contained in government files may be of two-fold import-
ance to the citizenry. First, the records may contain public information
which, if disclosed, would influence the electorate in the exercise of its
political control over the government; second, the information may aid
the private individual in conducting his personal affairs.
The public's right to inspect governmental records has long been
recognized, but this right has never been considered absolute.' By
judicial fiat, California adopted the common law rule which permitted
an individual to inspect public records only if he had a beneficial interest
therein.2 California eventually abandoned this requirement and extend-
ed the right of inspection to anyone who did not intend to use the
information for an "unlawful or scandalous purpose."' Despite the
seemingly expansive purview of the latter rule, the precise scope of the
public's right to inspect was obfuscated by judicial decisions which
narrowly construed the term "public record"'4 and by legislative enact-
ments that prohibited the inspection of certain documents.5 This confu-
sion was compounded by the often conflicting interpretive opinions
1. See Herbert v. Ashburner, 95 Eng. Rpts. 628 (1750).
2. Colnon v. Orr, 71 Cal. 43, 11 P. 814 (1886). At common law, the usual "ben-
eficial interest" was maintaining or defending a lawsuit to which the requested public
records were pertinent. See Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200, 205-06, 219 N.W. 749,
751 (1928).
3. Harrison v. Powers, 19 Cal. App. 762, 763, 127 P. 818, 818 (1912).
4. See, e.g., Coldwell v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 187 Cal. 510, 202 P. 879 (1921);
Mushet v. Dep't of Pub. Serv., 35 Cal. App. 630, 170 P. 630 (1917).
5. For an in-depth discussion of pre-Records Act history, see Comment, Access
to Governmental Information in California, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1650, 1665-80 (1966);
Comment, Inspection of Public Records Under California Law, 50 CAL. L. REV. 79
(1962).
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promulgated by the Legislative Counsel, the Attorney General, local
county counsel, and city attorneys.
6
In 1968 the California Public Records Act7 (hereinafter referred to
as the Records Act or the Act) was enacted in an attempt to clarify the
scope of the public's right to inspect public records.' The Act specifies
6. LEGIsLATIvE COUNSEL'S OPINION, FINAL REPORT OF CALIFORNIA STATE As-
SEMBLY STATEWIDE INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE 7, vol. 1, APPENDIX TO JOURNAL
OF THE ASSEMBLY, Reg. Sess. 1970 [hereinafter cited as ASSEMBLY INFORMATION COM-
MrITrEE].
7. Cal. Gov't Code §§6250-6260, enacted CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 1473, §39, at 2946.
For a general discussion of the history of the enactment of the Records Act and an over-
view of its exemptive provisions, see Schaffer, A Look at the California Records Act
and its Exemptions, 4 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 203 (1973-74).
8. CAL. GoV'T CODE §6250:
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals
to privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning the con-
duct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every
person in this state.
GOV'T CODE §6251:
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the California Public
Records Act.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §6252:
As used in this chapter:
(a) "State agency" means every state office, officer, department, division,
bureau, board, and commission or other state agency, except those agencies
provided for in Article IV (except Section 20 thereof) or Article VI of the
California Constitution.
(b) "Local agency" includes a county; city, whether general law or char-
tered; city and county; school district; municipal corporation; district; political
subdivision; or any board, commission or agency thereof; or other local public
agency.
(c) "Person" includes any natural person, corporation, partnership, firm, or
association.
(d) "Public records" includes any writing containing information relating to
the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any
state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. "Public
records" in the custody of or maintained by the Governor's office means any
writing prepared on or after January 6, 1975.
(e) "Writing" means handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photo-
graphing, and every other means of recording upon any form of communica-
tion or representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or
combination thereof, and all papers, maps, magnetic or paper tapes, photo-
graphic films and prints, magnetic or punched cards, discs, drums, and other
documents.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §6253:
(a) Public records are open to inspection at all times during the office hours
of the state or local agency and every citizen has a right to inspect any public
record, except as hereafter provided. Every agency may adopt regulations stat-
ing the procedures to be followed when making its records available in accord-
ance with this section.
The following state and local bodies shall establish written guidelines for ac-
cessibility of records. A copy of these guidelines shall be posted in a conspic-
uous public place at the offices of such bodies, and a copy of such guidelines
shall be available upon request free of charge to any person requesting that
body's records:
Department of Motor Vehicles
Department of Consumer Affairs
Department of Transportation
Department of Real Estate
Department of Corrections
Department of the Youth Authority
Department of Justice
Department of Insurance
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that any public record in -the possession of a state or local agency must
Department of Corporations
Secretary of State
State Air Resources Board
Department of Water Resources
Department of Parks and Recreation
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission
State Department of Health
Employment Development Department
Department of Benefit Payments
Public Employees' Retirement System
Teachers' Retirement Board
Department of Industrial Relations
Department of General Services
Department of Veterans Affairs
Public Utilities Commission
California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission
All regional coastal zone conservation commissions
State Water Quality Control Board
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District
All regional water quality control boards
Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District.
(b) Guidelines and regulations adopted pursuant to this section shall be con-
sistent with all other sections of this chapter and shall reflect the intention of
the Legislature to make such records accessible to the public.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §6253.5:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 6252 and 6253, statewide, county,
city, and district initiative, referendum, and recall petitions and all memoranda
prepared by the county clerks in the examination of such petitions indicating
which registered voters have signed particular petitions shall not be deemed to
be public records and shall not be open to inspection except by the public offi-
cer or public employees who have the duty of receiving, examining or preserv-
ing such petitions or who are responsible for the preparation of such memo-
randa.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §6254:
Except as provided in Section 6254.7, nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to require disclosure of records that are:
(a) Preliminary drafts, notes, or interagency or intra-agency memoranda
which are not retained by the public agency in the ordinary course of business,
provided that the public interest in withholding such records clearly outweighs
the public interest in disclosure;
(b) Records pertaining to pending litigation to which the public agency is
a party, or to claims made pursuant to Division 3.6 (commencing with Section
810) of Title 1 of the Government Code, until such litigation or claim has
been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled;
(c) Personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(d) Contained in or related to:
(1) Applications filed with any state agency responsible for the regulation
or supervision of the issuance of securities or of financial institutions, includ-
ing, but not limited to, banks, savings and loan associations, industrial loan
companies, credit unions, and insurance companies;
(2) Examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of,
or for the use of any state agency referred to in subdivision (1);
(3) Preliminary drafts, notes, or interagency or intra-agency communica-
tions prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of any state agency referred
to in subdivision (1); or
(4) Information received in confidence by any state agency referred to in
subdivision (1).
(e) Geological and geophysical data, plant production data and similar in-
formation relating to utility systems development, or market or crop reports,
which are obtained in confidence from any person;
(f) Records of complaints to or investigations conducted by, or records of
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intelligence information or security procedures of, the office of the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice, and any state or local police agency,
or any such investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local
agency for correctional, law enforcement or licensing purposes;
(g) Test questions, scoring keys, and other examination data used to ad-
minister a licensing examination, examination for employment, or academic ex-
amination;
(h) The contents of real estate appraisals, engineering or feasibility esti-
mates and evaluations made for or by the state or local agency relative to the
acquisition of property, or to prospective public supply and construction con-
tracts, until such time as all of the property has been acquired or all of the
contract agreement obtained, provided, however, the law of eminent domain
shall not be affected by this provision;
(i) Information required from any taxpayer in connection with the collec-
tion of local taxes which is received in confidence and the disclosure of the
information to other persons would result in unfair competitive disadvantage
to the person supplying such information;
(j) Library and museum materials made or acquired and presented solely for
reference or exhibition purposes;
(k) Records the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to
provisions of federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of
the Evidence Code relating to privilege;
(1) Correspondence of and to the Governor or employees of the Governor's
office or in the custody of or maintained by the Governor's legal affairs secre-
tary, provided public records shall not be transferred to the custody of the Gov-
ernor's legal affairs secretary to evade the disclosure provisions of this chapter;
(m) In the custody or maintained by the Legislative Counsel;
(n) Statements of personal worth or personal financial data required by a
licensing agency and filed by an applicant with such licensing agency to estab-
lish his personal qualification for the license, certificate, or permit applied for;
and
Nothing in this section is to be construed as preventing any agency from
opening its records concerning the administration of the agency to public in-
spection, unless disclosure is otherwise prohibited by law.
CAL. GOV'T CoDa §6254.7:
(a) All information, analyses, plans, or specifications that disclose the na-
ture, extent, quantity, or degree of air contaminants or other pollution which
any article, machine, equipment, or other contrivance will produce, which any
air pollution control district or any other state or local agency or district re-
quires any applicant to provide before such applicant builds, erects, alters, re-
places, operates, sells, rents, or uses such article, machine, equipment, or other
contrivance, are public records.
(b) All air or other pollution monitoring data, including data compiled from
stationary sources, are public records.
(c) All records of notices and orders directed to the owner of any building
of violations of housing or building codes, ordinances, statutes, or regulations
which constitute violations of standards provided in Section 1941.1 of the Civil
Code, and records of subsequent action with respect to such notices and orders,
are public records.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (e), trade secrets are not
public records under this section. 'Trade secrets," as used in this section, may
include, but are not limited to, any formula, plan, pattern, process, tool, mecha-
nism, compound, procedure, production data, or compilation of information
which is not patented, which is known only to certain individuals within a com-
mercial concern who are using it to fabricate, produce, or compound an article
of trade or a service having commercial value and which gives its user an op-
portunity to obtain a business advantage over competitors who do not know
or use it.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all air pollution emission
data, including those emission data which constitute trade secrets as defined
in subdivision (d), are public records. Data used to calculate emission data
are not emission data for the purposes of this subdivision and data which con-
stitute trade secrets and which are used to calculate emission data are not pub-
lic records.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §6254.8:
Every employment contract between a state or local agency and any public
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be disclosed to any citizen unless an exemption applies.' There are only
two means by which a record may be exempted from required disclo-
sure. First, the record may fall within one or more of fourteen specific
exemptions enumerated by the Act.1" In general, these exemptions are
official or public employee is a public record which is not subject to the pro-
visions of Sections 6254 and 6255.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §6255:
The agency shall justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the
record in question is exempt under express provisions of this chapter or that
on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not making the
record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the
record.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §6256:
Any person may receive a copy of any identifiable public record or copy
thereof. Upon request, an exact copy shall be provided unless impracticable
to do so. Computer data shall be provided in a. form determined by the
agency.
CAL. GoV'T CODE §6257:
A request for a copy of an identifiable public record or information produced
therefrom, or a certified copy of such record, shall be accompanied by payment
of a reasonable fee or deposit established by the state or local agency, provided
such fee shall not exceed ten cents ($0.10) per page or the prescribed statutory
fee, where applicable.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §6258:
Any person may institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative relief in
any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce his right to inspect or to receive
a copy of any public record or class of public records under this chapter. The
times for responsive pleadings and for hearings in such proceedings shall be
set by the judge of the court with the object of securing a decision as to such
matters at the earliest possible time.
CAL. Gov'T CoDE §6259:
Whenever it is made to appear by verified petition to the superior court of
the county where the records or some part thereof are situated that certain pub-
lic records are being improperly withheld from a member of the public, the
court shall order the officer or person charged with withholding the records
to disclose the public record or show cause why he should not do so. The
court shall decide the case after examining the record in camera, if permitted
by subdivision (b) of Section 915 of the Evidence Code, papers filed by the
parties and such oral argument and additional evidence as the court may allow.
If the court finds that the public official's decision to refuse disclosure is not
justified under the provisions of Section 6254 or 6255, he shall order the public
official to make the record public. If the judge determines that the public of-
ficial was justified in refusing to make the record public, he shall return the
item to the public official without disclosing its content with an order support-
ing the decision refusing disclosure. Any person who fails to obey the order
of the court shall be cited to show cause why he is not in contempt of court.
The court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the plaintiff
should the plaintiff prevail in litigation filed pursuant to this section. Such
costs and fees shall be paid by the public agency of which the public official
is a member or employee and shall not become a personal liability of the pub-
lic official. If the court finds that the plaintiff's case is clearly frivolous, it
shall award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the public agency.
CAL. Gov'T CoDE §6260:
The provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed in any manner to affect
the status of judicial records as it existed immediately prior to the effective date
of this section, nor to affect the rights of litigants, including parties to admin-
istrative proceedings, under the laws of discovery of this state.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §6261:
Notwithstanding Section 6252, an itemized statement of the total expendi-
tures and disbursement of any agency provided for in Article VI of the Cali-
fornia Constitution shall be open for inspection.
9. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6253.
10. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6254.
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designed either to protect the privacy of persons who have disclosed
confidential information to the government"' or to preserve state se-
crets,' 2 agency deliberative processes,"3 or confidential sources of infor-
mation.' 4  Second, a record may be withheld from the public even
though it does not fall within a specifically enumerated exemption, if
the government can demonstrate that public policy necessitates non-
disclosure of the record.15
This comment analyzes the scope and operation of the Act's dis-
closure, exemptive, and enforcement provisions. The emphasis of the
analysis, however, will be upon the statutory exceptions to the Act's
general policy of disclosure. In order to accomplish this analysis, the
reader will be referred to the relatively small number of California cases
which have interpreted some of the Act's provisions as well as to the
principles of the common law dealing with public records, and the
federal case law interpreting analgous provisions of the federal Free-
dom of Information Act'0 (hereinafter referred to as the FOIA). It
is hoped that this presentation will serve as a practical aid to both the
layman and the practitioner who seek access to governmental records
in California.
DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS
The Records Act epitomizes another attempt by the California Legis-
lature to reconcile the conflicts between the public's need to be informed
of the actions of government and the individual's need to maintain his
privacy. The accommodation of these conflicting interests has become
an increasingly difficult problem for the legislature in recent years. On
the one hand, the voting public and the legislature have manifested their
increasing concern with the "right to know"' 7 by adopting such laws as
Proposition 9,18 the Ralph M. Brown Act,1 9 and the Governmental
11. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§6254(c), 6254(e), 6254(i), 6254(n).
12. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§6254(b), 6254(f), 6254(k).
13. See CAL. GV'T CODE §6254(a).
14. See CAL. Govr CODE §§6254(f), 6254(k).
15. CAL. GOV'T CODE §6255.
16. 5 U.S.C. §552 (1968), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §552 (1975) [the FOIA was ex-
tensively amended in early 1975; these amendments do not affect the analysis of tho
federal case law used in this comment]. This comment will only attempt to "borrow"
some of the federal case law analysis. It is not intended to be read as a comparison
of the FOIA and the Records Act.
17. "Right to know" is the nomenclature assigned by the California Legislature to
legislation designed to expose governmental activities to the public. See ASSEMBLY
INTERIM COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT ORGANZATION, THE RIGHT To KNow, vol. 12,
no. 10 (1965).
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE §81000 et seq. [entitled the Political Reform Act of 1974].
19. CAL. GOV'T CODE §54950 et seq. Section 54953 of the Brown Act declares
that "[a]ll meetings of the legislative body of a local agency shall be open and public,
and all persons shall be permitted to attend. . ....
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Conflict of Interests Act.20 On the other hand, the California Supreme
Court has declared that the right to privacy is a fundamental right,21 and
its holding is now embodied in the California Constitution. 22 It is clear
that neither of these interests is so fundamental that it must be given
priority over the other in all situations.23 Thus, when enacting "right to
know" legislation, the legislature must preserve the right to privacy to
the fullest extent possible while simultaneously defining the instances in
which the right to know will be deemed paramount.24
The California Legislature demonstrated its awareness of this task
when it enacted the Records Act. Section 6250 of the Act states:
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature, mindful of the right of in-
dividuals to privacy, finds and declares ,that access to information
concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental
and necessary right of every person in this state.
25
This declaration concisely describes the interplay between the public's
right to inspect public documents and many of the Act's exemptive
provisions. The legislature has attempted to accommodate both the right
to know and the right to privacy by creating certain exemptions that
operate to prevent disclosure of information which, if revealed, would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of an individual's right to privacy.26
In order to promote the statutorily granted "fundamental right" of
access to governmental information, the Records Act provides that all
records of "state"2 7 and "local"' 28 agencies are "public records." Further-
20. CAL. Gov'T CODE §3600 et seq.
21. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 268, 466 P.2d 225, 232,
85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1970).
22. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, §1, adopted May 7, 1879, amended November 7, 1972.
23. See City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 269, 466 P.2d 225,
232, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1970); Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 36, 459 P.2d 912,
922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (1969).
24. At least one California case has indicated that the legislature may balance the
right to know and the right to privacy and demarcate the areas of disclosure and non-
disclosure of governmental information. Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App.
3d 645, 655, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (1974).
25. CAL. GOV'T CODE §6250 (emphasis added).
26. In Black Panther Party v. Kehoe the plaintiff contended that the right to know
is derived from the first amendment and is thus immune from the statutory exemptions
enumerated by the Records Act. Although no judicial decisions have yet completely
agreed with this proposition, the Kehoe court did state that "[tihere is an undoubted
connection between First Amendment freedoms and access to government files, espe-
cially those which record or illuminate official action." Black Panther Party v. Kehoe,
42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 654, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112. A number of writers have suggested
constitutional theories for the right to know: Hennings, Constitutional Law: The
People's Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667 (1959); Parks, The Open Government Prin-
ciple: Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 Gao. WAsH. L. REV. 1
(1957); Comment, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right,
27 IND. L. REV. 209 (1952).
27. Pursuant to Government Code section 6252(a), a "state agency" encompasses,
with certain exceptions, every state office, officer, department, division, bureau, board,
and commission or other state agency. Excepted from the definition are both houses
of the legislature, legislative committees established by either house, and all components
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more, the Act defines a "public record" in extremely broad terms so as
to mitigate the problems encountered with the common law's restrictive
and technical definition of a public record.2" Under Government Code
Section 6252(d), a "public record" is any "writing" which is related to
the public's business, and which is "prepared, owned, used, or retained
by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteris-
tics." The term "writing" is broadly defined so as to encompass every
possible form of record-keeping technique, including any new method
which may be developed in the future.3 0 By use of the phrase "retained
by any state or local agency" the legislature apparently intended to
include any record, whether the original or a copy, which is held by any
agency on a continuing basis.3"
Since the enactment of the Act in 1968, the legislature has added
several provisions which specifically include or exclude certain records
from the definition of a "public record." For example, the employment
contracts between state and local agencies and public officials or em-
ployees are public records under section 6254.8. In addition, section
6254.7 declares that notices and orders to building owners concerning
violations of the housing and building laws, and documents pertaining
to actions taken pursuant to those notices and orders, are public records.
Section 6254.7 also declares that documents embodying data on pollu-
tion are public records. On the other hand, specified trade secrets
relating to that pollution data, 2 and petitions concerning statewide,
of the judicial system, the Judicial Council, the Commissions on Judicial Appointments
and Judicial Qualifications, and the State Bar of California. However, the legislature
recently enacted the Legislative Open Records Act (CAL. Gov'T CODE §9070 et seq., en-
acted CAL. STATs. 1975, c. 1246, 1, at -. ), which contains provisions for making the
legislature's records available to the public. This new act's provisions are substantially
the same as those contained in the Records Act.
In contrast, the records of the governor and the legislative counsel are public records
under the Act. Before 1976, the governor's records were exempt from disclosure. See
CAL. Gov'T CODE §6254(1), enacted CAL. STATs. 1968, c. 1478, §39, at 2946. Present-
ly, under the latest amended version of the Act, there is only a limited exemption for
the records of the governor and his legal affairs secretary. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §6254
(1), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1246, §3, at -. However, only those records
which are prepared on or after January 6, 1975 are subject to disclosure under the Act.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE §6252(d), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1246, §2, at -. On
the other hand, the records of the legislative counsel are exempt from disclosure. CAL.
Gov'T CODE §6254(m).
The California Attorney General has opined that the University of California's rec-
ords are also "public records" under Government Code section 6252(a). 58 Ors. Air'y
GEN. 84 (1975).
28. A "local agency" includes any "county; chartered and non-chartered city; city
and county; school district; municipal corporation; district; political subdivision; or any
board, commission, or agency thereof; or other local public agency." CAL. Gov'r CODE
§6252(b).
29. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
30. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §6252(e).
31. See text preceding notes 190 infra.
32. CAL. GOV'T CODE §6254.7(d)-(e).
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county, city, and district initiatives, referenda, and recalls are not public
records. 3 The import of the provisions that exclude certain information
from the definition of a "public record" is that these records are not
subject to any of the Act's provisions.
The most significant of the Acts's disclosure provisions is Govern-
ment Code Section 6253, which provides that every "citizen"34 has the
right to inspect and make copies of public records during the office
hours of state and local agencies unless the particular record is exempt
from disclosure. This policy represents a significant departure from the
common law rule which limited the right of disclosure to those who had
a beneficial interest in the particular record.3 5 The Act requires no
subjective examination of an individual's motive for requesting inspec-
tion of a record;36 therefore, the existence of an ulterior motive for
seeking disclosure of a record, or the lack of any particular motive
whatsoever, should never preclude a requesting party from gaining
access to a public record.3 7 The Records Act only authorizes an objec-
tive determination as to whether the character or content of the record in
question requires that it be open for public inspection.3 8
Although section 6253 grants the right to inspect and make copies, a
citizen does not have the unfettered right to inspect public records at any
time and in any manner. Under section 6253(a) the agencies are
authorized to adopt regulations governing the procedures by which
records are to be made available to the public. 9 The precise scope of the
agencies' powers to promulgate these regulations, however, has not yet
been defined by the judiciary. In a pre-Act decision, Bruce v. Gregory,
40
33. CAL. GOV'T CoDE §6253.5.
34. It is interesting to note that while the legislature gives every "person" the
fundamental right of access to public records, CAL. Gov'T CODE §6250, only "citizens"
have the right to inspect during the office hours, CAL. Gov'T CODE §6253(a). A
literal reading of section 6253(a) would seem to exclude corporations, which are not
considered "citizens" for constitutional purposes. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936). However, since the legislature has specifically included corporations
and other business associations within the definition of "person" [section 6252(c)] and
has given every "person" the right of access to public records [section 6250], there
would seem to be no logical foundation for distinguishing between "person"1 and "citi-
zen." Thus the discrepancy would seem to be a case of careless draftsmanship.
35. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
36. Cf. K. DAvIs, ADMImiSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §3A.4, at 120 (1970 Supp.)
[hereinafter cited as K. DAVIs]. But cf. Wine Hobby, USA, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms, 502 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir. 1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670
(D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971); see text accompanying notes 154-
162 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 163-166 infra.
38. Cf. K. DAVIS, supra note 36, §3A.4 (1970 Supp.).
39. Government Code Section 6253(a) requires 31 state and local agencies to es-
tablish written guidelines for accessibility of public records. A copy of these guidelines
must be conspicuously posted and be available free of charge to any person requesting
the agency's records. In addition, all other state and local agencies are authorized to
adopt such procedures.
40. 65 Cal. 2d 666, 423 P.2d 193, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1967).
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the California Supreme Court did delineate the scope of an agency's
power to promulgate regulations pursuant to a statute containing lan-
guage which was almost identical to that used in Government Code
Section 6253 (a)."' In Bruce the supreme court stated that the public's
right to inspect public records is subject to an implied rule of reason.42
Accordingly, it held that an agency could devise procedures regulating
the public's access to records if such regulations were necessary to
promote one of the following goals: (1) to protect the records from
theft, mutilation, or accidental damage; (2) to prevent interference
with the orderly functioning of the office and its employees; or (3) to
prevent chaos in the records archives.43 If Bruce is still valid authority, it
is apparent that the agencies may only adopt regulations pursuant to
Government Code Section 6253(a) which are strictly necessary to
accomplish any one of the legitimate state goals set forth in the Bruce
decision. 4
4
Coextensive with the right to inspect public records is the right to
receive copies of those records.4 Pursuant to section 6256 any person
has the right to receive a copy 46 of any identifiable public record.
Federal case law interpreting the FOIA has held that an "identifiable"
record is one that is reasonably described so as to enable an agency
employee to locate the requested information.47 If the California courts
were to accept this federal test, once it is determined that a record is
identifiable, the language of section 6256 would seem to provide any
person with the absolute right to receive a copy.
Thus far, only one California appellate decision has concerned itself
41. The statute construed by the Bruce court provided that public records "are at
all times during office hours open to inspection . . . ." Former CAL. GOV'T CODE
§1227, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 1473, §38, at 2945. Government Code Section
6253(a), which was enacted to replace former section 1227, provides, in pertinent part,
that "[p]ublic records are open to inspection at all times during the office hours of the
state or local agency. .... "
42. 65 Cal. 2d 666, 676, 423 P.2d 193, 199, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265, 271 (1967).
43. Id. at 676, 423 P.2d at 199, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
44. Id. at 678, 423 P.2d at 201, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
The Bruce decision has been cited with approval by a lower appellate court in Rosen-
thal v. Hansen, 34 Cal. App. 3d 754, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1973) in relation to an agen-
cy's regulatory authority under Government Code section 6253(a). See text accom-
panying notes 48-56 infra. Therefore, it would seem that the rules delineated in Bruce
are still viable today.
45. Rosenthal v. Hansen, 34 Cal. App. 3d 754, 759, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260
(1973).
46. The right to receive copies of public records is subject to the tender of a rea-
sonable fee or deposit for copying costs, provided such fee does not exceed ten cents
per page or the applicable prescribed statutory fee. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6257, as
amended, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1246, §8, at -.
47. E.g., Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. FTC, 479 F.2d 183, 190 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d-935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970).
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with this issue. In Rosenthal v. Hansen48 it was held that an individual's
right to an agency-made copy of a record, under the rationale of Bruce,
is subject to an implied rule of reason.4 9 The plaintiff in Rosenthal had
requested a copy of the entire seven volume Benefit Determination
Guide, its present amendments, and the Unemployment Insurance No-
tices of the California Department of Human Resources Development.
He did not limit his request to specific groups of records within that
general category. The court held that an agency was required to prepare
and furnish copies pursuant to "specific" requests, but not as to "general"
requests.5 0 Unfortunately, the court did not elucidate its meaning of
these two types of requests. In formulating its decision the court seemed
to be influenced by the volume of the requested material, noting that
such "general" requests could result in the agencies entering into the
printing business."- It could be argued that a "general" request is one
whereby the plaintiff requests all the material in a large category of
records so that he may examine them to see which ones contain informa-
tion he actually needs. If such requests were honored, the requesting
party could evade the requirement of having to "identify" the records he
wanted; he would merely have to request all the records of a given
category.5 2 It is important to note, however, that the Rosenthal court
only held that the agency need not furnish the copies in compliance with
"general" requests. 53 An individual may still inspect and make his own
copies of the records, so long as he can do so without interfering with
the efficient operation of the office.5"
Assuming that a requested record is "identifiable," the Rosenthal
decision held that an individual who makes a "specific" request for a
record is entitled to an agency-made copy.55 Government Code Section
6256 specifies that the individual must be provided with an exact copy
unless it is impracticable for the agency to do so. However, the fact that
it is impracticable to make an exact copy does not preclude the person
from obtaining any copy whatsoever; he is still entitled to some type of
copy of the record.56 In this way, an effective accommodation between
48. 34 Cal. App. 3d 754, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1973).
49. Id. at 761, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 760, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
52. See Irons v. Schuyler, 465 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1076 (1972), affirming the Patent Office's denial of a demand for all unpublished manu-
scripts. The court held that the request for records must contain greater descriptive in-
formation.
53. 34 Cal. App. 3d 754, 761, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257, 262 (1973).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 759, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
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the "right to know" and the legitimate need for the agencies to operate
efficiently is achieved.
THE EXEMPTIONS
The Records Act does not require that all public records in the
possession of state and local agencies be open for public inspection.
Under Government Code Section 6254, the legislature has created
fourteen specific categories of exempt public records. The legislature has
also created a general exemption by which any record may be withheld
from -the public if the agency can demonstrate that "on the facts of the
particular case the public interest served by not making the record
public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the
record." 57 In all cases, however, the burden is on the government to
assert and prove the availability of an exemption.58 In the absence of
such an assertion all public records must be made available for public
inspection.
It is readily apparent from the previous analysis of the Act's disclo-
sure provisions that the judicial interpretation of the exemptive sections
will largely determine the extent of the public's right to inspect and
receive copies of public records. The federal courts have universally
accepted the proposition that the FOTA creates a liberal disclosure
requirement, limited only by specific exemptions which are narrowly
construed. 59 In narrowly construing some of the FOIA exemptions,
however, these courts have actually created additional judicially-imposed
limitations on disclosure.60 Unquestionably, some of these judicially-
created limitations derive from the courts' difficulties in interpreting
some of the FOIA's rather general and poorly drafted provisions."' The
Records Act, on the other hand, seems to be more carefully drafted and
should present fewer obstacles to California courts charged with the task
of interpreting its provisions.62 The Act contains no provision which
directs the courts to liberally construe the disclosure provisions or to
narrowly construe the exemptions.63 One California case, Black Panther
57. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6255 (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. E.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FrC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
60. See Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom
of Information Act, 48 TExAs L. RFV. 1261, 1274 (1970) (refers to these limitations
as "functional limitations.").
61. See Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1970); Davis, The Informa-
tion Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. C. L. REv. 761, 807-09 (1967).
62. "The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascer-
tain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." People
v. Super. CL, 70 Cal. 2d 123, 132, 449 P.2d 230, 237, 74 Cal. Rptr. 294, 301 (1969).
63. It would seem that if the legislature wished the courts to construe the Records
Act in a particular manner, it could easily have directed them to do so. For example,
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Party v. Kehoe,64 has explictly rejected -the federal policy of strict con-
struction of the exemptions, stating that "[tihe task is to construe the
exemptions neither broadly nor narrowly, but according to the court's
understanding of the legislature's 'real accord.' ,
In ascertaining the legislature's "real accord," Government Code
Section 6250 is pertinent because it evidences the legislature's policy as
one of disclosure while being mindful of individual privacy. The legisla-
ture's express concern for the right to privacy, by itself, seems to militate
against strict construction of the exemptions. However, there are at least
two other factors which lend additional support to this view. First, in
many instances, a citizen may be required to disclose personal data to
the government. For example, many regulatory, licensing, and law
enforcement agencies require citizens to divulge certain information that
might otherwise be kept private. A record containing such information
should only be disclosed to the public when necessary to promote
legitimate public inquiries into official conduct. 68 Disclosure of personal
information in other circumstances would arguably go beyond the
bounds of propriety and reason and therefore should not be permitted.er
Secondly, the private individual whose personal data is contained within
governmental files must rely upon the legislature to provide an exemp-
tion for that type of record. Since the Act makes no provision allowing
the individual to enjoin public disclosure, a judicially-adopted policy
of narrowly construing the exemptions might be contrary to legislative
intent and could impose an uncalled-for abridgement of individual
privacy. Hence, the following analysis will focus upon the apparent
legislative intent behind the creation of the Act's exemptions not upon
the interpretation that will most narrowly limit the scope of that particu-
lar exemption.
The discussion of the Act's exemptions has been organized so as to
emphasize the various types of exemptions, the purposes for their enact-
ment, and their interrelationship. The more general "public policy"
exemption is dealt with at the outset because it seems to reflect the
public interests that were considered by the legislature when it drafted
in the Governmental Conflict of Interests Act, the legislature specifically instructs the
courts to liberally construe the provisions of the Act. CAL. Gov'T CODE §3602.
64. 39 Cal. App. 3d 900, 114 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1974), vacated, 42 Cal. App. 3d
645, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
65. Id. at 909, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 730. But see Gallagher v. Boller, 231 Cal. App.
2d 482, 490, 41 Cal. Rptr. 880, 885 (1964), a pre-Act case, applying a rule of strict
construction when interpreting statutes allowing withholding of public records.
66. Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 652, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106,
110 (1974).
67. Cf. Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 37-38, 459 P.2d 912, 923, 81 Cal. Rptr.
360, 371 (1969).
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all of the Act's exemptive provisions.68 In addition, this exemption is
one which can conceivably apply to virtually any public record in the
possession of the state and local agencies. The second category of
exemptions may be characterized as those which are designed to protect
state secrets and/or confidential sources of information.6 1 These exemp-
tions evidence the legislature's implicit concern for administrative effi-
ciency. A third group of exemptions are specifically designed to preserve
the right to privacy of individuals whose personal data is contained
within public records. 70 Next, the analysis will turn to a single exemp-
tion of the Act designed to protect the work product and deliberative
processes of the agencies. 1 Finally, the reader is given a brief analysis
of the Act's other exemptive provisions which are of lesser signifi-
cance.
72
A. Section 6255: "Public Policy" Favors Nondisclosure
The significance of Government Code Section 6255 lies in the fact
that it provides a means by which an agency may withhold a public
record which would not be exempt under any of the fourteen specific
exemptions delineated in section 6254. Pursuant to section 6255, any
record may be withheld if the agency is able to demonstrate that "on the
facts of the particular case the public interest served by not making
the record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by dis-
closure of the record."78
Section 6255 specifically states that there are two public interests
which must be considered when access to a public record is at issue, the
interest served by disclosure and the interest served by nondisclosure.
However, this section does not purport to define these public interests.
The public interest in disclosure is probably synonymous with the
public's "right to know" and would thus embody all the concerns
associated with the public's need to be informed of governmental activi-
ties.74 This conclusion is warranted by an examination of -the Records
Act's various provisions. First, the legislature has declared that access to
governmental information is a fundamental and necessary right of any
person without regard to his personal characteristics or needs. " Second,
68. CAL. GoVT CODE §6255; see text accompanying notes 73-93 infra.
69. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§6254(b), 6254(f), 6254(k); see text accompanying notes
94-149 infra.
70. CAL. Gov'T CoDE §§6254(c), 6254(e), 6254(i); see text accompanying notes
150-175 infra.
71. CAL. GoV'T CODE §6254(a); see text accompanying notes 176-192 infra.
72. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§6254(g), 6254(h), 6254(j), 6254(n); see text accompany-
ing notes 193-196 infra.
73. CAL. GOV'T CODE §6255 (emphasis added).
74. See text accompanying notes 17-26 supra.
75. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6250; see text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
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section 6255 places the burden upon the government to overcome this
fundamental right by demonstrating either that the record comes within
a specific exemption or that there is a public interest in nondisclosure
which "clearly outweighs" this right. Thus, once an individual demon-
strates that he wishes to inspect a public record in the possession of a
government agency, his fundamental right to inspect that record aris-
es.78 Of course, it could be argued that section 6255, due to the
inclusion of a case-by-case balancing of the public interests in disclosure
and nondisclosure, peculiarly allows a court to examine a requesting
individual's motives for requesting a record. This argument can be
rebutted by two important considerations. First, section 6255 refers only
to the public interest in disclosure, not to any private interests of the
requesting individual. Second, and more importantly, once a particular
record has been disclosed to any member of the public, the record must
be made available to every other member of the public.'7 Therefore, it
would seem useless in the long-run to examine private interests in
disclosure because once one individual is found to be entitled to inspect
the record in question, every other person must have an equal "right to
know" the information embodied within that record; selective disclosure
is not permitted.
7 8
If the public interest in disclosure is synonymous with the "right to
know," then it would seem that such an interest would be a heavy and
constant weight in the balancing process. If this is true, then the
propriety of exempting a record under section 6255 will depend upon
the weight imputed to the public interest in nondisclosure. The concerns
underlying the public's interest in nondisclosure are not so easily dis-
cerned, and thus they must be ascertained by referring to various sources
of legislative intent.
The specific exemptions enacted in section 6254 may be of some aid
in ascertaining the legislature's conception of the public interest in
nondisclosure. An examination of section 6254 reveals that the legisla-
ture intended to protect from disclosure those records which would
expose personal or financial information relating to an individual 9 or
which compromise agency integrity by exposing state secrets,8" confi-
dential sources of information81 or agency deliberative processes.8"
When the legislature balanced the competing interests in formulating
76. CAL. GoV'T CODE §6253(a).
77. See text accompanying notes 197-205 infra.
78. Id.
79. See CAL. GoV'T CODE §§6254(c), 6254(i), 6254(n).
80. See CAL. GoV'T CODE §§6254(b), 6254(f), 6254(h), 6254(k).
81. See CAL. GoV'T CODE §§6254(f), 6254(k).
82. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §6254(a).
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section 6254, it found that the public interests in nondisclosure of these
types of records outweighed the public interest in disclosure. It can be
argued that section 6255 was designed to act as a catchall for those
individual records similar in nature to the categories of records exempted
by section 6254, but which the legislature determined, in balancing the
competing interests, would not justify nondisclosure as a general rule. If
this interpretation of section 6255 is accepted, the provisions of section
6254 will provide appropriate indicia as to the nature of the public
interest in nondisclosure and will thus aid the courts in determining the
disclosability of a document under section 6255.
The types of concerns comprising the public interest in nondisclosure
may also be ascertained by referring to California's pre-Act case law.
Section 6255 embodies the established California common law rule that
public policy demands certain records should not be open to indiscrimi-
nate public inspection, even if they are in the custody of a public official
and even if they contain material of a public nature.88 Therefore it can
be argued that the legislature, by embodying this common law rule in
section 6255, intended to protect the same interests that were protected
by prior case law. These interests were described by a California appel-
late court in Craemer v. Superior Court:s4
[W]here there is no contrary statute or countervailing public pol-
icy, the right to inspect public records must be freely allowed. In
this regard the term "public policy" means anything which tends to
undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of
personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought to feel
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or the public good.85
Even if it is found that disclosure of the record would undermine the
public's sense of security for individual rights or would conflict with one
of the purposes served by the exemptions delineated in section 6254, the
record must still be disclosed unless it can be shown that the public
detriment caused by disclosure "clearly outweighs" the public interest in
disclosure. 6 The few cases that have been decided indicate that only the
most compelling circumstances will justify nondisclosure of a public
record. For example, there are two cases which have denied disclosure
in order to promote the compelling public interest in guaranteeing
83. See e.g., City 8 County of San Francisco v. Super. Ct., 38 Cal. 2d 156, 238
P.2d 581 (1951); Craemer v. Super. Ct., 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1968); Runyon v. Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 26 Cal. App. 2d 183, 70 P.2d 101
(1938).
84. 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968).
85. Id. at 222, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
86. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6255.
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criminal defendants a fair trial. In Craemer, a pre-Act case, 7 the court
found that the transcripts of on-going grand jury proceedings could
lawfully be exempted from public disclosure. The court noted, however,
that the public interest in nondisclosure would dissipate once the pro-
ceedings were completed. At that time, the public interest in providing
the defendants a fair investigation would have been satisfied and the
public's interest in guarding against "secret tribunals" would necessitate
disclosure of the records.8 8 In a post-Act case, Yarish v. Nelson,""
another court found that the release of a criminal defendant's prison
files to the press could seriously prejudice his right to a fair trial and
therefore denied disclosure. In reaching this decision the court noted
that the defendant was charged with murder and kidnapping in a
highly-publicized case and that the trial court had entered a publicity
order.
90
In the absence of compelling circumstances the courts will apparently
require disclosure. For example, in Uribe v. Howie," the Agricultural
Commissioner contended that the public interest in the effectiveness of
the Commission's pesticide control program required that the reports
given by pesticide applicators be exempted from public disclosure. The
Commissioner argued that he would lack confidence in the accuracy of
the reports if the applicators knew that the reports would be made
public. The court found that the public interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of the reports was not strong enough to clearly outweigh
the public need for this data. 2 The court noted that such information
could be useful in studying the long-range effects of pesticides on human
and animal life."3 Therefore, disclosure of the record was ordered.
B. Section 6254: Specific Exemptions
1. Prohibited By Law; Privilege
Subsection 6254(k) is perhaps the most crucial and far-reaching
87. Although Craemer was decided before the enactment of the Records Act, its
reasoning may still be persuasive; see text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
88. 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 226, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193, 201 (1968).
89. 27 Cal. App. 3d 893, 104 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1972).
90. Id. at 902-03, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
91. 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 96 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1971).
92. Id. at 210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
93. Id. It would appear that, by enumerating the factors that bolstered the public
interest in disclosure, the Uribe court was treating the public interest in disclosure as
a variable, rather than as a constant, factor in the balancing process. However, it should
be noted that the court's discussion of the public interests in disclosure and nondisclosure
related to the evidentiary privilege for trade secrets. CAL. Evm. CODE §1060; see note
97 infra. When the court reached its discussion of Government Code section 6255 it
merely stated that it had already discussed the balancing of -the competing public inter-
ests and found that disclosure best served the public interest. Thus, in relation to sec-
tion 6255, the Uribe court never stated that the public interest in disclosure was or was
not a constant in the balancing process. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
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exemption of the Records Act. It exempts "r]ecords the disclosure of
which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to provisions of federal or
state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code
relating to privilege. '9 4 This exemption was apparently enacted to insure
that the Records Act would not be used as a means of circumventing the
many statutes which exist independently of the Act and which prohibit
or condition the disclosure of governmental records. 95 In addition, this
subsection absolutely prohibits disclosure of public records containing
information which is unconditionally privileged under various provisions
of the Evidence Code.96
The most troublesome of the evidentiary privileges brought within the
Records Act by subsection 6254(k), and the privilege which seems to
be most frequently asserted to protect public records from disclosure,9 7
has been the privilege relating to "official information" set forth in
Evidence Code Section 1040. This privilege can be asserted by a govern-
ment agency whenever "official information" is contained within a
public record. Section 1040 defines "official information" as "informa-
tion acquired in confidence by a public employee in the course of his
duty and not open, or officially disclosed, to the public prior to the time
the claim of privilege is made."98 Whether the information has been
acquired in confidence is determined by statute or as a matter of public
policy. 9 In the absence of a statute expressly declaring that a certain
record is received in confidence, information will generally be consid-
ered to be confidential if its disclosure would impair the government's
ability to obtain similar information in the future.100 Once it has been
determined that the government possesses official information, section
1040 creates a privilege which is partly absolute and partly conditional
in nature. Subsection 1040(b) (1) creates an absolute privilege for
official information the disclosure of which is forbidden by either federal
or state law. Under subsection 1040(b)(2), all other official informa-
94. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6254(k).
95. For a comprehensive list of all California statutes pertaining to public records,
see the "Index of Code Sections Relating to Public Records," ASSEMBLY INFORMATION
CommnrrE, supra note 6, Appendix A, 33-40. This index, however, is only current to
1970.
96. E.g., CAL. Evm. CODE §§954 (lawyer-client privilege), 994 (physician-patient
privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
97. Two California appellate courts have also dealt with the incorporation of the
privilege for trade secrets under California Evidence Code Section 1060. Calif. School
Employees Ass'n v. Sunnyvale Elem. Sch. Dist., 36 Cal. App. 3d 46, 65-66, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 445 (1974); Uribe v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 206-11, 96 Cal. Rptr. 493,
500-04 (1971).
98. CAL. EVID. CODE §1040(a).
99. B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK, §42.1 (1972).
100. See City & County of San Francisco v. Super. Ct., 38 Cal. 2d 156, 162-63, 238
P.2d 581, 585 (1951); Runyon v. Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 26 Cal. App. 2d
183, 185, 79 P.2d 101, 102 (1938).
1976 / Public Records Act
tion is privileged from disclosure only if "[d]isclosure of the informa-
tion is against the public interest because the necessity for preserving the
confidentiality of the information outweighs the necessity for disclosure
in the interest of justice ... 101
It should be noted that while this evidentiary privilege deals with
"information" whereas the Records Act is concerned with "records,"
there is no conflict between Evidence Code Subsection 1040(b)(1) and
Government Code Subsection 6254(k)-both provisions yield to specif-
ic exempting or prohibitory state or federal statutes. On the other hand,
there is arguably a conflict between Evidence Code Section 1040(b)(2)
and Government Code Section 6255. The California Attorney General
has suggested that reference solely to Government Code Subsection
6254(k) and Evidence Code Section 1040 would result in a "curious
circular process" because subsection 6264(k) permits privileged infor-
mation to be kept confidential, while section 1040 creates a privilege for
information which is already confidential. 102 The Attorney General
solves this alleged dilemma by making reference to Government Code
Section 6255, pointing out that the legislative aim of subsection
1040(b)(2) is the furtherance of the policy enunciated by section
6255.103 The Attorney General's resolution of this problem however
appears to be analytically unsound. It seems that subsection 6254(k)
merely provides that if a public record contains "official information"
which is otherwise entitled to protection under Evidence Code Section
1040, such protection is also afforded by an exemption of the Records
Act. 0 4  In other words, for the purposes of initially analyzing the
evidentiary privilege, subsection 6254(k) may be ignored.1
0 5
The Attorney General's opinion -that Evidence Code Section
1040(b)(2) is the furtherance of the policy enunciated by section 6255
engenders important questions as to the interrelationship of these two
facially similar provisions. When a public entity asserts a conditional
101. Evidence Code Section 1040 specifically grants this privilege only to the pub-
lic entity. This privilege is waived if the information is disclosed to anyone other than
another interested public official; see Markwel v. Sykes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 642, 649-50,
343 P.2d 769, 774 (1959). See generally Comment, Governmental Privileges: Road-
block to Effective Discovery, 7 U.S.F.L. RFv. 282, 285-86 (1972-73).
102. 53 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 148 (1970).
103. Id. at 148-49.
104. Government Code Subsection 6254(k) merely continues the pre-Act policy of
keeping certain records closed to public inspection due to specific governmental statutory
privileges. See Comment, Inspection of Public Records Under California Law, 50 CA.
L. REv. 79, 84-87 (1962).
105. It should be noted here that by the incorporation of Evidence Code Section
1040, an agency will be able to assert this privilege whenever a member of the public
requests inspection of a public record embodying official information. Standing by it-
self, section 1040 may only be asserted at proceedings in which testimony may be com-
pelled. See McDonough, The California Evidence Code: A Pricis, 18 HAsT. L.J. 89,
106 (1966).
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privilege under Evidence Code Subsection 1040(b)(2) the court must
engage in a weighing or balancing process in order to ascertain whether
the public interest in securing information on a privileged, confidential
basis outweighs the necessity for disclosure. 106 In performing this task
the court must balance the public interest involved without regard to the
government's interest, if any, as a party in the outcome of the litiga-
tion.107 Furthermore, the burden is on the public entity to demonstrate
that it would be against the public interest to disclose the information.108
Although subsection 1040(b)(2) includes a balancing test which
appears to be similar to that included in Government Code Section
6255, it seems that the two provisions may be meaningfully distin-
guished in two respects. First, Government Code Section 6255 refers to
the public interest in disclosure, while subsection 1040(b)(2) refers to
the "necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice." Thus, while the
public interest in disclosure under section 6255 must be ascertained
without examining the particular needs or qualifications of the request-
ing individual,"0 9 the language of subsection 1040(b)(2) indicates that
the courts will examine the specific legal needs of the party who is
seeking disclosure;' arguably a much narrower interest than the afore-
mentioned public interest. On the other side of the scale, the interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of official information is probably that of
allowing the government to operate more effectively by protecting its
secrets,'' and is thus, at least superficially, a narrower interest than the
"public interest in nondisclosure." Second, subsection 1040(b)(2) re-
quires that the interest in nondisclosure "outweigh" the interest in
disclosure, whereas section 6255 requires that the former interest must
"clearly outweigh" the latter. Therefore, since subsection 1040(b)(2)
does not require the balance to tip as heavily in favor of nondisclosure as
106. B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK, §42.1 (1972).
107. CAL. Evm. CODE §1040(b) (2).
108. Id. At this time the court will determine the correctness of the public official's
initial decision that the privilege for official information applies to the information in
question. Markwell v. Sykes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 642, 647, 343 P.2d 769, 772 (1959).
Appellate cases have shown that the asserted privilege will be honored if the government
can make some showing that the free flow of information may be impeded in the future
should the privilege be denied. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Super. Ct.,
38 Cal. 2d 156, 162, 238 P.2d 581, 584 (1951). However, mere allegations of future
harm will not sustain the privilege; the government must demonstrate some plausible
justification for protecting the information. Uribe v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 210,
96 Cal. Rptr. 493, 503 (1971).
109. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
110. See People v. Super. Ct., 19 Cal. App. 3d 522, 530, 97 Cal. Rptr. 118, 123
(1971); OPINION OF THE LEGISLATIvE COUNSEL, "Report of Assembly Committee on Ju-
diciary on Assembly Bill No. 333," JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY, Vol. 1, 1751-52 (1965
Reg. Sess.).
111. OPINION OF Ti LEGisI.ATVE COUNSEL, "Report of Assembly Committee on
Judiciary on Assembly Bill 333," JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY, vol. 1, 1751 (1965 Reg.
Sess.).
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does section 6255, and since subsection 1040(b)(2) balances interests
which are arguably more narrow than the public interests included
within section 6255, it would appear that Evidence Code Section
1040(b)(2) is designed to afford more protection for governmental
information than is Government Code Section 6255.112 Hence, it could
be argued that the Attorney General is incorrect in his assertion that the
requirements of these two provisions are equivalent.
The obvious differences between the balancing tests found in Evi-
dence Code Subsection 1040(b)(2) and Government Code Section
6255 could be of great importance to the requesting individual, depend-
ing upon his need for the information in question. If an agency can
show that the requested record contains official information, the court
will be compelled to use the test embodied in Evidence Code subsection
1040(b)(2) rather than the stricter test embodied in Government Code
Section 6255. As noted previously, the former test requires that the
court examine the requesting individual's private needs for the informa-
tion "in the interest of justice." It would seem that the criminal defend-
ant who needs the information in order to conduct a proper defense will
often be able to overcome the conditional privilege for official informa-
tion. However, an entirely different question is presented when the only
"interest" asserted is the individual's "fundamental right of access"
granted by Government Code Section 6250. In light of the many other
federal and state statutes coming into play through Government Code
Subsection 6254(k) which prevent public inspection of certain records,
it would seem that the fundamental right of access, or the "right to
know," will not be, standing alone, a sufficient "interest" to overcome
the privilege attaching to official information. Therefore, it might be
asserted that Evidence Code Section 1040 offers a unique method by
which an agency may defeat the public's right to inspect a public record,
notwithstanding the fact that the particular record would not be exempt
under any of the Act's exemptions other than subsection 6254(k).
2. Investigatory Files
Subsection 6254(f) is a pervasive exemption which may encompass a
significant number of public records in the possession of certain state
and local agencies. This provision exempts
112. One court has observed that "[i]t is also generally recognized that when the
public interest in securing information necessitates the free communication of such in-
formation on a privileged, confidential basis, disclosure of information so secured is
against the public interest." Terzian v. Super. Ct., 10 Cal. App. 3d 286, 295, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 806, 814 (1970). Surely the scale would not tip so readily in favor of nondis-
closure if the exemption under Government Code Section 6255 were asserted by a gov-
ernment agency.
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[rlecords of complaints to or investigations conducted by, or rec-
ords of intelligence information or security procedures of, the of-
fice of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, and
any state or local police agency or any such investigatory or secur-
ity files compiled by any other state or local agency for correction-
al, law enforcement, or licensing purposes.113
Structurally, subsection 6254(f) can be bifurcated into the following
elements: first, the record must embody a complaint, an investigatory
file, intelligence information, or security procedures; secondly, it must
be in the possession of the Attorney General, the Department of Justice,
any police agency or any other agency which compiles records for
correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes." 14
The language of subsection 6254(f) appears to be absolute in ex-
empting records of complaints, investigatory files, intelligence informa-
tion, and security procedures. In order to prevent the agencies from
rendering records exempt merely by labeling them as such, the courts
have attempted to define the criteria which must be met in order for a
record to qualify for an exemption under subsection 6254(f). Although
California appellate cases have briefly dealt with "complaints" 15 and
"security procedures,""' the major difficulty has arisen in relation to the
term "investigatory files." Thus far, the California courts appear to be
following the definition of an "investigatory file" delineated in a federal
FOTA case, Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC.117 In that case, the District of
Columbia Circuit held that an "investigatory file" exists only when there
is a concrete and definite prospect that enforcement proceedings will be
initiated."18 The first California case to adopt this restrictive definition,
Uribe v. Howie, 1 9 noted its reasons for doing so:
It is not enough that an agency label its file "investigatory" and sug-
gest that enforcement proceedings may be initiated at some un-
specified future date or were previously considered ....
113. CAL. GOV'T CODE §6254(f).
114. Although "records of complaints" and "intelligence information" are not in-
cluded in the second clause of subsection 6254(f) pertaining to "correctional law en-
forcement or licensing purposes," one California appellate court has held that these
terms are implicitly included within "any such investigatory or security files." Black
Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 650-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 111 (1974).
115. A "complaint" is not per se a part of an investigatory file and is not dependent
upon the creation of one. As a result, the record of complaint is exempted by its con-
tent as an independent document. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 653, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11.
116. One California appellate court has ruled that "security purposes" include, in
addition to "building plans, lay-out plats, maps and diagrams that depict [correctional
facilities]," lists compiled by the Department of Corrections for security purposes indi-
cating imate membership in violent or disruptive organizations. Procunier v. Super.
Ct., 35 Cal. App. 3d 211, 212, 110 Cal. Rptr. 531, 531 (1973).
117. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (interpretting 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7) (1967)).
118. Id. at 939.
119. 19 Cal. App. 3d 194,96 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1971).
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• . . In their course of activities the regulatory agencies of this
state accumulate numerous records which may, under certain cir-
cumstances, be used in disciplinary proceedings. Virtually any
record so kept could be put to such use. To say that the exemption
created by subdivision (f) is applicable to any document which a
public agency might, under any circumstances, use in the course of
a disciplinary proceeding would be to create a virtual carte blanche
for the denial of public access to public records. The exception
would thus swallow the rule. This could not have been the intent
of the Legislature.
120
The Uribe holding has since been explicitly adopted by one other
California appellate decision 121 and cited by another, 122 thereby indicat-
ing that the "concrete and definite" requirement may ultimately become
the accepted California definition.' 2 3
It is significant, however, that the federal interpretation of an "investi-
gatory file" has been undergoing an evolutionary process since the
Bristol-Myers decision.124 Although there is at least one federal circuit
adhering to the Bristol-Myers definition,125 the present weight of author-
ity is clearly moving toward a broader, much less restrictive definition of
an "investigatory file."'2 6 The D.C. Circuit has unquestionably aban-
doned the Bristol-Myers definition in several of its subsequent cases, 7
holding in one case that a file is "investigatory" if it is "compiled for
adjudicative or enforcement purposes. Whether the adjudication or en-
120. Id. at 212-13, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05 (citations omitted).
121. State of California ex rel. Div. of Indus. Safety v. Super. CL, 43 Cal. App.
3d 778, 784, 117 Cal. Rptr. 726, 729 (1974).
122. Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 651, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106,
109 (1974).
123. In addition, it seems implicit in Uribe that the exemption has a definite dura-
tion. Once enforcement proceedings have been terminated there is no longer a concrete
and definite prospect of such proceedings; thus, the record would no longer fall within
the definition of an "investigatory file" and would not be exempt from disclosure. It
should be noted, however, that the language of Government Code Subsection 6254(f)
imposes no durational limitations once it has been found that the exemption applies.
124. See Comment, The Investigatory Files Exemption to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 463 (1974). It should also be noted that 5 U.S.C. §552
(b)(7) has recently been amended to specifically enumerate the purposes for which an
investigatory file may be exempt. 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (7), amended, 88 STATS. 1563-1564
(1975).
125. See Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971).
126. E.g., Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger,
502 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rural Housing Alliance v. Dept. of Agriculture,
498 F.2d 73, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Aspin v. Dept. of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 28-29 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Weisberg v. Dept. of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 993 (1974); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 889 (1972); Evans v. Dept. of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 918 (1972).
127. E.g., Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger,
502 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rural Housing Alliance v. Dept. of Agriculture,
498 F.2d 73, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Aspin v. Dept. of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 28-29 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Weisberg v. Dept. of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 993 (1974).
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forcement has been completed is not determinative, nor is the degree of
likelihood that the adjudication or enforcement may be imminent
... 128 In addition, these courts have held that the exemption re-
mains in effect indefinitely in order to promote the long-term govern-
mental interests that the various courts have identified as being served
by the exemption.129 Therefore, in light of the federal developments in
the area, there is a distinct possibility that a future California court may
reject the Uribe line of analysis and adopt the new federal approach.
The inherent bifurcation to which subsection 6254(f) lends itself
indicates that it is not only the type of record involved that will be
important in determining the applicability of the exemption, but also the
type of agency which compiles it. This conclusion is evidenced by a
recent California appellate court's interpretation of the meaning of the
term "law enforcement purposes." In State of California ex rel. Division
of Industrial Safety v. Superior Court,130 the court stated that the
exemption does not ipso facto apply to the investigatory files of any
administrative agency which is responsible for the enforcement of one or
more statutes.' 3' The court held that the term "'law enforcement pur-
poses' . . . refers to law enforcement in the traditional sense-that is, to
the enforcement of penal statutes, etc.' 3 2 To be compiled for "law
enforcement purposes" the subject matter of the agency's files "must
relate to the same type of criminal law enforcement subject matter as is
covered generally by the immediately preceding provisions of [subsec-
tion 6254(f)],"'1 33 which provide 'that a record must be in the posses-
sion of the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, or any state or
local police agency.
In light of the express language of subsection 6254(f) and of the
Division of Industrial Safety court's references to "penal statutes" and
128. Rural Housing Alliance v. Dept. of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 80 (D.C. Cir.
1974). However, if no enforcement proceedings are contemplated, the investigatory file
cannot be exempt. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, 508
F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1974).
129. Various federal courts have proposed justifications for the indefinite duration
of the exemption for "investigatory files:" (1) preservation of the secrecy of investi-
gative techniques; Aspin v. Dept. of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1972); (2) preservation of confidential
sources of information; Evans v. Dept. of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 823 (5th Cir. 1971);
Cowles Communication, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 727 (N.D. Cal.
1971); (3) preservation of prosecutorial discretion; Weisberg v. Dept. of Justice, 489
F.2d 1195, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 755, 762 (D.D.C.
1974); and (4) preservation of the privacy of individuals who are the subject of the
investigation; Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger,
502 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1974); contra, Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th
Cir. 1971).
130. 43 Cal. App. 3d 778, 117 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1974).
131. Id. at 784, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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"criminal law enforcement subject matter," it is manifest that agencies
which compile records for the purposes of enforcing criminal laws are
engaged in "law enforcement purposes." It should be noted, however,
that "penal statutes" are not limited to those laws which are a part of the
Penal Code.134 A "penal statute" is any any statute that "imposes a
penalty or creates a forfeiture as the punishment for the neglect of some
duty or the commission of some wrong. . . commanded or prohibited
by law."'13 5 Therefore, it could be argued that an agency is engaged in
"law enforcement purposes" when it compiles an investigatory file for the
purpose of imposing a civil penalty.13 On the other hand, under the
Division of Industrial Safety holding, it would seem that files compiled
pursuant to an investigation which is intended to culminate in the
issuance of an order to comply with the law would not bring the
exemption into operation.117 Since a mere order to comply would not
result in a penalty or forfeiture, the statute authorizing the agency to
issue an order would not be a "penal statute."
13 8
While the Division of Industrial Safety decision leaves the definition
of "law enforcement purposes" unclear, the case is significant because
it may portend a restrictive interpretation of that term by the California
courts. In light of the qualifying language in subsection 6254(f), it
would seem that the legislature may have intended to restrict the mean-
ing of that term. By using the phrase "correctional, law enforcement, or
licensing purposes," it appears that the legislature definitely intended to
limit the types of agencies which could avail themselves of this exemp-
tion. If the legislature had intended for the exemption to apply to the
files of any agency which is responsible for the enforcement of any
134. Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 640, 29 P. 251, 254 (1892).
135. Levy v. Super. Ct., 105 Cal. 600, 607, 38 P. 965, 966 (1895).
136. It could be argued that the imposition of a civil penalty would not be within
the Division of Industrial Safety court's requirement of "criminal law enforcement sub-
ject matter." One California court has held that a civil penalty is not completely crim-
inal in nature because there is no peril of the loss of liberty. People v. Witzerman, 29
Cal. App. 3d 169, 176-77, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288-89 (1972).
137. For example, the Division of Industrial Safety is vested with the power to issue
and enforce orders and special orders pertaining to industrial safety. CAL. LABOR CODE
§6305 et seq. These orders are issued to employers, directing them to correct unsafe
conditions, devices, or places of employment which pose a threat to the health or safety
of an employee.
138. Although the proposed distinction between an investigation resulting in the im-
position of a civil penalty and one resulting in the issuance of an agency order would
seem to comport with the Division of Industrial Safety holding, it would appear to pre-
sent a serious problem as to the classification of certain files. For example, an agency
may instigate an investigation in order to determine whether there is a violation of a
law, and if there is a violation, what action should be taken. Until the agency decides
to impose a civil penalty, or to take even stronger action, it would seem that the file
in question would not be compiled for "law enforcement purposes" under Division of
Industrial Safety. Thus, the applicability of the exemption would essentially depend
upon what action the agency takes, not upon the content of the file. It would seem
that the availability of any exemption should depend upon the latter consideration.
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criminal or civil law, it would seem contradictory to have qualified the
second clause of subsection 6254(f) by adding -the -terms "correctional"
and "licensing. 139
It seems clear from the preceding discussion that the scope and
operation of the exemption found in subsection 6254(f) is far from
final resolution by the courts. California is offered the option of either
adopting the broader, less restrictive definitions of "investigatory file"
and "law enforcement" being developed by the federal courts, or of
adopting its own, more narrow definitions. Whatever the ultimate deter-
.uination i the California courts, a consistent formulation of these terms
seems desirable in order to give full effect to this important exemption.
3. Pending Litigation or Tort Claims Involving a Public Agency
Under subsection 6254(b), an exemption is allowed for records
pertaining to pending litigation or tort claims 4 ° to which a public
agency is a party. 14 1 This exemption is conditional, remaining in effect
only "until such litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated or
otherwise settled." A California appellate court has stated that the main
purpose of this provision is to provide "public agencies with the protec-
tion of the attorney-client privilege, including work-product, for a limited
139. In 1975 the legislature enacted an amendment to subsection 6254(f) to delete
the word "licensing" from the term "for correctional, law enforcement or licensing pur-
poses" and to add further qualifying language:
Records of complaints to or investigations conducted by, or records of intelli-
gence information or security procedures of, the office of the Attorney General
and the Department of Justice, and any state or local police agency, or any
such investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local agency
for correctional or law enforcement purposes or for the purpose of determin-
ing whether administrative or criminal action should be taken to restrain or
prosecute purported violations of law or to deny, suspend, or revoke a profes-
sional, vocational, or occupational license, certification, or registration.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §6254(f), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1231, §1, at - (SB 2,
1975-76 Reg. Sess., as amended by the Assembly, Sept. 11, 1975) (emphasis added).
However, due to an oversight, this amendment was nullified, or "chaptered out," under
the authority of Government Code Section 9605 when the legislature passed another bill
during the same session which changed subsection 6254(f) back to its present and origi-
nal form. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §6254, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1246, § -, at
-. The fact that this subsection was amended in such a fashion is significant for two
reasons. First, it further supports the contention that "law enforcement purposes" is not
intended to apply to the enforcement of all criminal and civil laws. And, second, it
indicates that the legislature will probably reamend subsection 6254(f) in 1976.
It should be noted that a restrictive California interpretation of "law enforcement pur-
poses" is a significant departure from the accepted federal interpretation of the same
term in the FOIA. Under the analogous FOIA exemption, "law enforcement" has been
interpreted to encompass all criminal and civil laws. See, e.g., Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, 508 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1974); Center for
Nat'1 Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Koch v. Dept. of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1974).
140. These are claims against the government brought pursuant to CAL. Gov'T CODE
§810 et seq.
141. The reader should note that this exemption can include files that would not
qualify as "investigatory files" for purposes of a §6254(f) exemption. See text accom-
panying notes 113-139 supra.
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period while there is ongoing litigation."1 42 Although preservation of
this privilege could be one of the purposes behind the exemption, it
seems that the agencies would already be afforded this privilege under
the authority of Government Code Subsection 6254(k). Furthermore,
subsection 6254(b) has been interpreted to encompass many more
types of records then would be protected by the attorney-client or work-
product privileges.143 Thus, it would seem that this subsection was
primarily designed to prevent a litigant opposing the government from
using the Records Act's disclosure provisions to accomplish earlier or
greater access to records pertaining to pending litigation or tort claims
than would otherwise be allowed under the rules of discovery,'" rather
than being aimed solely at preventing discovery of a limited class of
documents falling within the purview of the attorney-client or work-
product privileges. Under this construction, the government is placed in
legal parity with other litigants regarding access to records which pertain
to pending litigation.
It seems obvious that the scope of subsection 6254(b) is potentially
broad enough to encompass a vast number of agency records. Whether
this potentiality will be realized, however, depends upon the judiciary's
answers to the following questions: (1) what is "pending litigation" or a
tort claim; (2) what is the duration of the exemption; and (3) are there
certain types of records to which this exemption does not apply?
The exemption under subsection 6254(b) arises only when litigation
is pending. Under California law, a civil action is pending once it has
been commenced, 4" and commencement occurs when there has been a
filing of a complaint and service of process on the defendant. 4 ' In the
case of a tort claim, it would seem that the analagous time for the
exemption to become operative is when the claim is filed with the
agency pursuant to Government Code Section 910.147 Therefore, it can
be argued that the exemption does not arise until an action or tort claim
has been filed. If this interpretation is adopted, it would appear that a
prospective litigant could circumvent the exemption merely by request-
142. State of California ex rel. Div. of Indus. Safety v. Super. Ct., 43 Cal. App.
3d 778, 783, 117 Cal. Rptr. 726, 729 (1974).
143. For example, a court has noted that Government Code Section 6254(b) is
broad enough to include trade secrets. Calif. Sch. Emp. Ass'n v. Sunnyvale Elem. Sch.
Dist., 36 Cal. App. 3d 46, 65, 111 Cal. Rptr. 433, 445 (1974).
144. See City of Los Angeles v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. App. 3d 778, 784-85, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 365, 369 (1973).
145. CAL. CODa CIV. PRoc. §1049.
146. E.g., San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co. v. Super. Ct., 155 Cal. 30, 99 P. 359
(1908).
147. Government Code Section 910 sets out the procedure that must be followed
when bringing a tort claim against a government entity.
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ing disclosure of any record prior to the actual filing of his action or
claiM.
148
Literal compliance with the terms of subsection 6254(b) would result
in this exemption being operative until the "litigation or claim has been
finally adjudicated or otherwise settled." This interpretation comports
with California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1049, which provides
that a civil action is pending until its final determination upon appeal, or
until its final adjudication or satisfaction of judgment. However, not-
withstanding the express language of subsection 6254(b), it can be
argued that the exemption should no longer apply once the information
has been obtained by the opposing litigant through discovery. Support
for this proposition may be found in federal case law interpreting the
FOIA. Federal decisions have held that an FOIA exemption which is
primarily designed to prevent premature discovery becomes inoperative
once the information has been discovered. 149 Since subsection 6254(b)
is apparently designed to accomplish this same end, it would seem that
the federal analysis should be persuasive in interpreting that subsection.
Furthermore, by construing subsection 6254(b) in this manner both the
Records Act's major goal of allowing maximum disclosure of public
records on a nonselective basis and the government's need to effectively
litigate its case would be promoted.
There is also some question as to the types of records which may be
withheld pursuant to subsection 6254(b). On its face the exemption
authorizes an agency to withhold from all members of the public any
record that pertains to pending litigation or to tort claims. Therefore, a
record that was formerly accessible to the public may conceivably
become exempt from disclosure if someone files a lawsuit or tort claim
to which the record pertains. This result would be detrimental to the
opposing party, who would be precluded from access except by way of
discovery proceedings, and to the public, which would be completely
denied access. In order to prevent this problem, it could be argued
that the exemption should cover only those records which come into
existence after the action or claim has been filed. Although a party
opposing the government will be able to gain earlier access to records by
148. The fifth version of the legislative bill which became the Records Act included
the term "prospective litigation." AD 1381, 1968 Regular Session, as amended by the
Senate, July 19, 1968. The modifier "prospective" was deleted and replaced with "pend-
ing," which would seem to indicate that the legislature contemplated the requirement of
filing an action or claim before the exemption would be operative. AB 1381, 1968 Reg-
ular Session, as amended by the Senate, July 27, 1968.
149. E.g., Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 23-24 (4th Cir. 1971); Legal Aid Soc'y
of Alameda County v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1972). These cases
refer to the FOIA exemption dealing with "investigatory files." 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)
(1967).
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exercising his right to inspect prior to filing an action or claim than he
would have under the rules of discovery, this effect would seem to be of
minimal consequence when compared to the public detriment resulting
from nondisclosure. Since one of the primary purposes of the Records
Act is to provide the public with maximum, nonselective access to
public records, it would seem to be more desirable to perpetuate the
accessibility of records that have originally been available to the public
than it is to prevent an opposing litigant from achieving earlier access to
a record that he will probably be able to discover in any event. Thus,
once a record has been made available for public inspection, it should
continue to be open to the public even if it subsequently pertains to
pending litigation or tort claim.
4. Personnel, Medical, or Similar Files
Subdivision 6254(c) creates an exemption for "[p]ersonnel, medical, or
similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." This exemption epitomizes the legisla-
ture's attempt to resolve the inherent conflict between the "right to
know" and the right to privacy.15° It is conceivably broad enough to
cover many types of records, depending upon the interpretation of
"similar files." However, to date no California case has yet interpreted
this section and the federal cases interpreting the almost identical FOIA
provision'51 have divided over its meaning. The exemption presents a
conjunctive test, consisting of two elements. To be exempt the material
must be a personnel, medical, or similar file, and its disclosure must
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. With regard to the first
element of this test, "personnel files" have been classified as including
both the personnel records of government employees and those of
private citizens who are required to submit similar information to the
government' 52 and "similar files" have been classified as those records
containing data concerning very personal or intimate details of an
individual's life.153
Once it has been determined that a record is a "personnel, medical, or
similar file," in order to be exempt, the agency must still demonstrate
that its disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
The federal cases have been divided over the test to be applied in
determining when the disclosure of a file will constitute an unwarranted
150. See text accompanying notes 17-26 supra.
151. 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (1967).
152. 53 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 144 (1970).
153. Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1973).
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invasion of personal privacy. In Getman v. NLRB,1 54 the court held that
the exemption authorizes the courts to equitably "balance the right of
privacy of affected individuals against the right of the public to be
informed."'15 In that case two labor law professors requested the names
and addresses of certain union members whom they wished to contact in
relation to a study on union elections. The court, in granting access to
these records, held that the disclosure of the desired information consti-
tuted only a minor invasion of the union members' privacy and that this
invasion was justified in light of the quality of the study, the background
and qualifications of the applicants, and the public's interest in the study
itself. Although the court recognized that this approach was inconsistent
with the FOIA's general policy of nonselective disclosure, it felt that the
language of this particular exemption uniquely necessitated an examina-
tion of the requesting party's motives.' 56 Accordingly, the court stated
that requests by future applicants would have to undergo a similar
balancing test and if the applicants were "less well-qualified" or envi-
sioned a "less carefully designed or more disruptive study," disclosure
might be denied.' 5 7
The hypothetical situation envisioned by the Getman court became a
reality three years later in Wine Hobby, USA, Inc. v. Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco & Firearms.5 8 In that case the applicants were distributors
of wine-making equipment who wanted to send advertising brochures to
amateur winemakers. In order to effectuate this plan they sought the
names and addresses of all amateur winemakers filing for tax-exempt
status. In granting disclosure of the requested records the trial court
rejected the contention that the records were "similar files" within the
meaning of the FOIA exemption, and, in addition, apparently rejected
the reasoning of Getman.59 The circuit court reversed, holding that the
exemption did apply on the facts presented. 60  The court reasoned that
since the applicants wanted the information for commercial purposes
there was no direct or indirect public benefit. Therefore, subjecting the
amateur winemakers to continuous mail from Wine Hobby, USA, Inc.
would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.1 61
The problems with the Getman-Wine Hobby approach are obvious.
First, when the courts undertake to weigh equitable factors such as the
154. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971).
155. Id. at 674.
156. Id. at 674, n.10.
157. Id.
158. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
159. Wine Hobby, USA, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 363 F.
Supp. 231 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
160. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
161. Id. at 137.
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applicant's need for the information, access to public records becomes
more difficult and uncertain. More importantly, the utilization of this
approach results in selective disclosure of public records. This result is
contrary to the fundamental goal of the FOIA and the Records Act,
which is to grant all persons equal right of access to public records
without respect to certain individuals who are judged to be deserving on
the facts of a particular case.1"2
A different interpretation of this exemption has been developed by
another federal decision, Robles v. EPA.163 In Robles the plaintiffs
sought access to the names and addresses of individuals whose homes
had been the subject of scientific tests relating to the use of uranium
tailings for land fill. The court held that the interest of the party seeking
disclosure was irrelevant; the right of access under the FOIA "is not to
be resolved by a balancing of equities or a weighing of need or even
benefit" to the party requesting the information. 64 The court found the
invasion of the homeowners' privacy to be minimal and allowed disclo-
sure.1
65
Under the Robles decision, the availability of this exemption is deter-
mined by a unilateral examination of the extent of the diminution of
individual privacy. In order to determine the degree of diminution, one
commentator has urged that the courts utilize the traditional tort defini-
tion of an invasion of privacy: if disclosure would offend the ordinary
sensibilities of a reasonable man then it should not be permitted. 166 By
utilizing this test, the courts could determine the availability of the
exemption without engaging in the often perplexing task of isolating the
applicant's motives for requesting inspection or the public purposes to
be served by disclosure.
Given the choice between the Getman-Wine Hobby and Robles ap-
proaches, it would seem that the latter is preferable in light of the fact
that it is consistent with the policy of promoting nonselective disclosure.
The Robles analysis recognizes that the legislature has already balanced
the competing interests and determined that some personnel, medical,
and similar files should not be disclosed to the public due to considera-
tions of individual privacy. The second clause of subsection 6254(c)
162. Cf. Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); Bannercraft Clothing
Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 352, n.6, rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 1
(1974); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1971); K. DAvis,
supra note 36, §3A.4, at 120 (1970 Supp.).
163. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
164. Id. at 848.
165. Id.
166. Comment, Invasion of Privacy and the F~reedom of Information Act: Getman
v. NLRB, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, 539-40 (1971).
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thus operates as a specific limitation on the public's right to inspect by
directing the courts to refuse disclosure if they objectively determine that
the invasion of individual privacy is unwarranted.
5. Financial or Commercial Information Received in Confidence
Three subsections of Government Code Section 6254 create exemp-
tions for various records containing information of a financial or com-
mercial nature. Although there might be other exemptions which imply
that information must be confidential,1 7 these subsections specifically
require that the information actually be received in confidence. Subsec-
tion (d) protects information that is disclosed in confidence to state
agencies responsible for the regulation or supervision of securities issues
or of financial institutions. Subsection (e) exempts "[g]eological and
geophysical data, plant production data and similar information relating
to utility systems development, or market or crop reports, which are
obtained in confidence from any person." Subsection (i) covers infor-
mation required from a local taxpayer, which is received in confidence,
that would result in a competitive disadvantage if disclosed. The lan-
guage of these exemptions is basically self-explanatory. Their common
denominator is that all require exempt information to be received in
confidence from a source outside the government.
To date, there has been no California case law defining the phrase
"received in confidence" as it is used in the Records Act. However, a
brief summary of the federal case law interpreting the more generally-
worded FOIA exemption for confidential information a16  may be help-
ful.169
Under the federal decisions, confidential information of a financial or
commercial nature is that "which would customarily not be released to
the public by the person from whom it was obtained. 1 7 0 These cases
have found that the exemption serves the two-fold purpose of maintain-
ing governmental efficiency and protecting the financial privacy of the
individual. 171 Accordingly, information will be considered confidential
if its disclosure is likely to have the effect of either impairing the
government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future or
167. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §6254(n).
168. 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4) (1967).
169. For a detailed discussion, see Note, Public Disclosure of Confidential Business
Information Under the Freedom of Information Act: Toward a More Objective Stand-
ard, 60 CORnEL L. RE;v. 109 (1974), criticizing the federal approach.
170. Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
171. Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974); M.A. Schapiro & Co.
v. SEC, 339 F. 3upp. 467, 471 (D.D.C. 1972).
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causing substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from
whom the information was obtained.1"2 The fact that the information
has been elicited under a promise of secrecy may be given some weight,
but is not a controlling factor.1 71
It should be noted that the agency will be able to claim a privilege
under Evidence Code Section 1040 in most instances where these types
of exemptive provisions are involved.17 4 It is also conceivable that
certain types of financial and commercial information could come under
the exemption for "similar files" contained in Government Code Subsec-
tion 6254(c) if they are of a highly personal nature, 75 notwithstanding
the fact that the information would not be exempt under one of the sub-
sections enumerated above.
6. Preliminary Drafts and Internal Memoranda
Subsection 6254(a) creates an exemption for "[preliminary drafts,
notes, or interagency or intra-agency memoranda which are not retained
by the public agency in the ordinary course of business, provided that
the public interest in withholding such records clearly outweighs the
public interest in disclosure."' 7' The language of this exemption seems
to be susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, and thus it
may be helpful to examine some of the policy considerations which may
have influenced the legislature to draft an exemption of this nature.
Subsection 6254(a) may reflect the widely-followed common law
view that only writings which represent ultimate official action should be
regarded as "public records" subject to inspection.' 7 On the other hand,
federal cases interpreting a comparable FOIA provision have offered
other justifications for the existence of such an exemption. These cases
have pointed out that the exemption is apparently designed to insure
that all policy perspectives will be voiced by protecting the confidential-
ity of an agency's deliberative and consultative processes. 1 8 As a collat-
eral effect, it also eliminates the possibility that the public will be misled
by exposure to discourse among officials preliminary to the final deter-
172. Pac. Architects & Eng. Inc. v. Renegotiation Bd., 505 F.2d 383, 384 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Natl Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1005 (D.D.C. 1974).
173. Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973); Nat'l Parks & Conservation
Ass'n v. Morton, 351 F. Supp. 404, 407 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 498
F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
174. See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
175. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
176. CAL. GOV'T CODE §6254(a) (emphasis added).
177. For an extensive critique of this common law policy, see MacEwan v. Holm,
226 Ore. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961).
178. Cf. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-90 (1973); Schwartz v. IRS, 511 F.2d 1303,
1305 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1967)].
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rination of agency policy. 179 Hence, officials will be judged by the final
decisions, not by matters they considered in reaching that decision.
Unfortunately, there are no California appellate decisions which have
interpreted subsection 6254(a). Hence, until this provision is authorita-
tively construed, one must rely on accepted rules of statutory construc-
tion and on common sense to determine the legislative intent behind
subsection 6254(a). Due to the nature of the exemption, it would seem
that "preliminary" is meant to modify "draft, .... notes," and "inter-
agency of intra-agency memoranda."1 0 In addition, it seems clear that
the balancing test imposed by subsection 6254(a) is also meant to apply
to "preliminary drafts, notes, or interagency or intra-agency memoran-
da." On the other hand, due to the placement of the punctuation, it ap-
pears that the phrase "not retained... in -the ordinary course of busi-
ness" applies only to "interagency or intra-agency memoranda."'' Al-
though reasonable men may differ as to the above construction, this
comment's analysis of subsection 6254(a) proceeds on the assumption
that the latter construction will ultimately be accepted by the California
judiciary. Regardless of the legislature's intended interrelationships of the
various parts of subsection 6254(a), however, the purview of this
exemption will ultimately depend on the interpretation of the terms
"preliminary," "interagency or intra-agency memoranda," and "not re-
tained. . . in the ordinary course of business," and upon the function
of the balancing test which has been superimposed upon the entire
provision.
The federal courts distinguish between "decisional" memoranda,
which are not exempt from disclosure, and "pre-decisional" memoran-
179. Cf. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 718
(D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 168 (1975).
180. It could be argued that "preliminary" is meant to modify only "drafts." This
conclusion could be reached by noting the use of the disjunctive "or" between "notes"
and "interagency or intra-agency memoranda," possibly indicating that "preliminary"
was not meant to modify such memoranda. If this is the effect of the word "or," then
it would seem "preliminary" would not modify "notes" either. If such a result were de-
sired, subsection 6254(a) should be: "Preliminary drafts and notes, or interagency or
intra-agency memoranda. .. "
181. "In general, working papers are not available unless they are retained for future
reference." ASSEMBLY INFORMATION COMMrTTEE, supra note 6, at 9. This statement
seems to indicate that the Committee feels that the term "not retained ... in the ordi-
nary course of business" is intended to modify "preliminary drafts, notes, or interagency
or intra-agency memoranda." This conclusion may coincide with the legislative intent,
but it is not warranted by the puncuation structure of subsection 6254(a). The phrase
"not retained ... in the ordinary course of business" appears in the same clause as "in-
teragency or intra-agency memoranda." If "not retained ... in the ordinary course of
business" is meant to modify all of the preceeding terms then a comma should be in-
serted between "memoranda" and "which." It should be noted that the legislature did
place a comma between "business" and "provided," indicating that the balancing test
would apply to all the preceeding terms, and not just to "interagency or intra-agency
memoranda."
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da, which are exempt from disclosure. 182 "Decisional" memoranda are
documents which reflect policy already made and announced by the
agency. "Pre-decisional" memoranda are composed exclusively for pur-
poses of assisting policy formulation. 8 Under this criteria the critical
factor in determining the status of a document is whether it is represent-
ative of the agency's final decision.' 84 So long as the document is
representative of the final decision it will be available for public inspec-
tion, even though it was one of the first documents drafted by the
agency during its decision-making process and even though the final
decision contains substantially the same information.
85
It may be argued that "preliminary," as used in subsection 6254(a),
is analogous to the federal "pre-decisional" documents. Under this
interpretation, preliminary drafts would be comprised of proposals
which were considered by agency officials during the course of their
deliberations but would not reflect the final decision. On the other hand,
it is possible that the legislature intended to use "preliminary" in its
chronological sense. However, this interpretation would conditionally
exempt every draft except the one which is the embodiment of the
agency's final decision. Since it might often be necessary to examine the
information upon which a decision is based in order to ascertain its
import, and since the primary purpose of the exemption is probably that
of promoting full and free discussion among public officials during their
deliberations, this interpretation would seem undesirable. The public's
right to know the information upon which the agency formulated its
decision would be severely abridged while the government's interest in
protecting the integrity of its deliberative processes could be accom-
plished by exempting only those records which do not contain informa-
tion incorporated into the final decision. Therefore, it would seem that
the proper accomodation between the "right to know" and efficient
agency administration could be accomplished by interpreting "prelimi-
nary drafts" as being synonymous with the federal "pre-decisional"
memoranda.
Another source of uncertainty under subsection 6254(a) lies in the
meaning of the terms "interagency" and "intra-agency." Presumably, an
182. See, e.g., Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710,
719 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption
For Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 HARV. L. Rnv. 1047, 1057-63 (1973).
183. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 719 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
184. The document must also be deliberative, rather than largely a statement of
facts, in order to be exempt; see, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973); Mont-
rose Chemical Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
185. Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See
Schwartz v. IRS, 511 F.2d 1303, 1305-06 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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"agency" for purposes of this subsection means one that is covered by
the Records Act under section 6252. If this is the case, then both the
receiving and the sending agency must be a state or local agency as
defined by the Act in order for a memorandum to be classified as
"interagency." Therefore, it would appear that memoranda passed be-
tween an agency and members of the legislature, which is not an
"agency" under the Act, would not be exempt under subsection
6254(a). 88 However, even if both the receiving and sending entities are
agencies within the meaning of section 6252, the memoranda may still
not be exempt. There is federal authority holding that interagency
memoranda do not automatically become exempt merely because they
are customarily passed from agency to agency; the involved agencies
must mave a legitimate purpose for exchanging such memoranda. 1 7
The federal judiciary has also held that a document may originate
outside the agency and still be considered an "intra-agency" document if
certain factors are present. In Wu v. National Endowment for Humani-
ties,188 the court extended the exemption for intra-agency documents to
include the memoranda of uncompensated consultants who had advised
the agency to reject the plaintiff's request for an endowment. A later
case clarified the holding in Wu by indicating that not all consultants
who advise an agency would qualify under this exemption;189 outside
consultants must become the functional equivalent of the agency by
making decisions for the government in order for the exemption to be
operative. 190 Therefore, under the federal analysis, documents can still
be classified as "intra-agency" when the originator is an outside agent of
the agency; the document need not be created within the confines of the
agency's office by agency personnel.
In order for interagency and intra-agency memoranda to be exempt,
subsection 6254(a) requires that they must not be retained by the
agency in its ordinary course of business. Thus, the interpretation of
"not retained. . . in the ordinary course of business" would seem to be
the key to determining the scope of the exemption for these memoranda.
Since subsection 6254(a) is probably designed to protect the agency's
deliberative processes, common sense would dictate that documents
which are "not retained" would be those which the agency will dispose
of once there has been a final disposition of the matter at hand.
186. Cf. K. DAviS, supra note 36, §3A.21, at 156.
187. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
188. 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1972).
189. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Dept. of HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 24748
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
190. Id.
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However, a question arises as to the length of time an agency may keep
these materials before they will be considered to have been retained in
the ordinary course of business. It would seem that an agency should not
be able to preserve materials for the benefit of future planners while
simultaneously maintaining an exemption for the documents. Therefore,
it could be argued that once there is no longer an immediate need for
such material in the decision-making process the agency must either
dispose of it or make it available to the public.
Unlike most of the other subsections of Government Code Section
6254, the application of subsection 6254(a) is made conditional by the
imposition of a balancing test. Hence, in order to keep its preliminary
documents from being revealed to the public the agency must demon-
strate that the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the
public interest in disclosure.191 Obviously, due to the identical language
of the two provisions, subsection 6254(a) requires a balancing of the
same public interests as required by Government Code Section 6255.192
A question arises, however, as to whether the legislature intended that
the public interest in disclosure be balanced against the general public
interest in nondisclosure, or whether the focus should sharpen upon the
reasons for not disclosing the particular record being requested. Argua-
bly the examination should focus on the individual record since the
interest in nondisclosure of preliminary documents may vary from docu-
ment to document. If an individual focus were not required then it
would seem pointless to have included a balancing test in the first
place-the general public interest in nondisclosure would either demand
that all preliminary documents be exempt or that all be non-exempt.
Since the legislature obviously felt that at least some preliminary docu-
ments should not be disclosed, it would appear that the balancing test
must be applied on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, it would seem that
the agency must demonstrate in each case that disclosure of the particu-
lar preliminary record in question would seriously interfere with the
legitimate public need for a well-reasoned decision-making process with-
in and among the state and local agencies.
7. Miscellaneous Exemptions
Government Code Section 6254 also contains several exemptions of
relatively minor importance that will be encountered only in a limited
number of situations. Subsection (g) creates an exemption for various
data relating to licensing, employment, or academic examinations. This
191. CAL. GoV'T CODE §6254(a).
192. See text accompanying notes 73-93 supra.
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exemption is designed to prevent future examinees from gaining access
to test questions, scoring keys, and other materials.198 Completed exami-
nation papers may be made available at the discretion of the public
official in custody of them. 94 Subsection (h) conditionally exempts the
contents of real estate appraisals, feasibility studies, and other evalua-
tions made for the state in relation to the acquisition of property or other
contractual agreements. Once any such acquisition or agreement is
consummated, the aforementioned records are subject to public inspec-
tion.195 Thus, subsection (h) places the government in legal parity with
private individuals insofar as the power to contract and acquire property
is concerned. Subsection (j) protects certain reference materials in a
public agency's library. For example, the legal library of the Attorney
General is not open to the public on a regular basis.'9 0 However, this
exemption protects only museum and reference materials used solely for
exhibition or reference purposes. Finally, subsection (n) exempts
"[s]tatements of personal worth or personal financial data required by
a licensing agency and filed by an applicant with such licensing agency
to establish his personal qualification for the license, certificate, or
permit applied for."
C. Disclosure Resulting in Waiver of an Exemption
The exemptions delineated in Government Code sections 6254 and
6255 protect certain records from required disclosure; they do not
prohibit disclosure. Consequently, in the absence of an express statutory
prohibition, the agencies are vested with the power to disclose exempt
records if they so desire.197 In Black Panther Party v. Kehoe198 the court
held, however, that once an exempt record has been disclosed to a
member of the public it loses its exempt status and the agency cannot
thereafter refuse anyone access to that particular record. 9 9 In Kehoe,
the plaintiffs sought disclosure of citizens' complaints concerning licen-
sees of the Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services. The Bureau
had given copies of these complaints to the licensees in order to en-
courage voluntary correction of violations. The court ruled that this
193. ASSEMBLY INFORMATION COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 10.
194. Id.
195. Government Code Subsection 6254(h) also provides that the laws of eminent
domain are not to be affected. Under the laws of eminent domain, the purchase price
or consideration becomes public information after acquisition of the property. CAL.
Gov'T Coon §7275, added by, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1240, § 27, at -.
196. AssEMBLY INFORMATION CoMMrTTEE, supra note 6, at 11.
197. "Nothing in this section is to be construed as preventing any agency from
opening its records concerning the administration of the agency to publ inspection, un-
less disclosure is otherwise prohibited by law." CAL. GovT CODE §6254.
198. 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
199. Id. at 656-57, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
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practice of selective disclosure constituted a waiver of the exemption
and therefore the records had to be made available to the public.2"0
The court indicated, however, that the Bureau could have preserved the
exemption by informing the licensees of the nature of the complaints
without physical delivery of the documents.
20 1
The Kehoe court did not state whether there are any exceptions to the
rule prohibiting selective disclosure. There are, however, three possible
situations in which the courts may find exceptions to this rule: first,
where the subject of a file wishes to inspect the record in order to
examine its veracity; second, where the agency has disclosed the exempt
record to another agency; and third, where the exempt record has been
disclosed pursuant to a discovery order.
In light of the Act's failure to specifically authorize an examination of
individual needs for disclosure, it follows that the request of a person
seeking access to records containing information about himself will be
denied if the record in question is exempt from disclosure. 0 2 Therefore,
in the absence of a legislative enactment to allow this procedure, it
would seem that a judicial exception to the Kehoe rule would be
contrary to the Acts basic policy of nonselective disclosure. An analo-
gous situation arises when an agency in possession of an exempt record
discloses the information to another agency. It is probable that not all
communications between the agencies will be considered "interagency"
memoranda so as to be exempt under Government Code Section
6254(a). This result could obtain either because the document is re-
tained by the agency or because the recipient-agency does not have a
sufficient business interest in the record to fall within the purview of that
subsection.20 Irrespective of subsection 6254(a), it could be argued
that the public's need for efficient interagency cooperation and interac-
tion justifies liberalization of the Kehoe rule to permit nondisclosure of
records which have been transferred from one agency to another so long
as the record was originally exempted from disclosure and was received
in confidence by an agency which had an official interest in its con-
tent.204
200. Id.
201. Id. at 658, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
202. See Younger v. Berkeley City Council, 45 Cal. App. 3d 825, 833, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 830, 834-35 (1975), holding that Government Code Section 6254(f) precluded the
Berkeley City Council from giving individuals the right to see their state arrest records
in order to examine their veracity.
203. See text accompanying notes 186-191 supra.
204. See Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Comment, Interagency Information Sharing: A Legal Vacuum, 9
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A third situation which may justify an exception to the nonselective
disclosure rule arises when an exempt document is "discovered" by a
private litigant. On the basis of Kehoe the argument could be made that
this document should be made available for public inspection. On the
other hand, it may be asserted that a distinction can be drawn between
this situation and the facts of Kehoe. In Kehoe the agency waived the
exemption by voluntarily disclosing the records. In contrast, when a
record is discovered, it could be argued that there is no waiver of the
exemption because the disclosure was involuntary in that it was judicial-
ly ordered.2
0
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
A. Judicial Remedies
If an individual believes that an agency is wrongfully withholding
public records, he may seek to compel disclosure of the record by
initiating injunctive or declaratory proceedings in the superior court of
the county in which the record was created or kept confidential. 20 0 The
time for responsive pleadings and hearings are set by the court "with the
object of securing a decision . . . at the earliest possible time.
207 If
there is a prima facie showing that the requested records are (1) public,
and (2) being improperly withheld by the agency, then the court shall
order the custodian to "disclose the public record or to show good cause
why he should not do so."2 " In determining whether the record should
be disclosed the court is, under certain circumstances, empowered to
examine the document in camera.20 9 If the records are not found to be
exempt pursuant to either Government Code Sections 6254 or 6255 the
court will order the records to be disclosed. In addition, the Act has re-
cently been amended to provide for the award of court costs and reason-
able attorney's fees to the plaintiff who prevails in an action to compel
disclosure of a public record. However, these costs and fees are the
SANTA CLARA LAWYER 301, 306 (1969); cf. Coldwell v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 187 Cal.
510, 521, 202 P. 879, 884 (1921).
205. But see Markwell v. Sykes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 642, 649-50, 343 P.2d 769, 773-
74 (1959) (privilege not to disclose record was permanently waived by official who did
not pursue any of the remedies open to him to challenge the trial court's decision that
the privilege did not apply).
206. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§6258, 6259.
207. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6258.
208. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6259.
209. Under Government Code Section 6259 the court may examine the record in
camera if permitted by Evidence Code Section 915(b). Evidence Code Section 915(b)
allows an in camera inspection only if the court is ruling on a claim of privilege pur-
suant to Evidence Code Section 1040 (official information), Evidence Code Section
1041 (identity of informer), or Evidence Code Section 1060 (trade secrets).
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liability of the public agency only, and not of the public official person-
ally.
2 10
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Although the Act explicitly provides for judicial remedies by which
an individual may enforce his right to inspect public records, there is
some question as to whether an individual must exhaust any available
administrative remedies before he seeks judicial relief.211 Government
Code Section 6253, subsection (a) authorizes state and local agencies to
adopt regulations governing inspection procedures. Implicitly, this provi-
sion also allows the agencies to formulate administrative appellate proce-
dures by which an individual may seek review of an agency's determina-
tion that a requested record is exempt. One state agency, the California
Public Utilities Commission, has devised such procedures.212 The PUC
regulations provide that an applicant who has been denied access to a
record may appeal that decision before the full Commission in San
Francisco.21 However, under this procedure, a party seeking review will
have to travel to San Francisco in order to appear before the full
Commission. In addition, there are PUC regulations which may make it
more difficult for an individual to present an effective and inexpensive
appeal.
214
In California the general rule is that any available administrative
remedies must be exhausted before applying to the courts for relief.215
The courts will stay administrative proceedings and hear the case only
when the plaintiff can show he will suffer an irreparable injury216 or that
his administrative remedies are inadequate or unavailable.2 1 7 Therefore,
under the general California rule, it would seem that an individual must
comply with administrative procedures such as those adopted by the
210. CAL. GOV'T CODE §6259, as amended, CAL. STArs. 1975, c. 1246, §9, at -.
211. The FOIA generally requires a plaintiff to exhaust his available administrative
remedies before resorting to the courts for relief. 5 U.S.C. §55Z. See Renegotiation
Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1974); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
212. PuBLIC UTILmS COMMISSION OF THE SrATE OF CALIoRN, Gen. Order No.
66-C (June 25, 1975).
213. Id. §3.4 at 5.
214. Id. §4.1 at 6 (subpoena demanding original records or personal appearance of
the record's custodian is an unwarranted interference with the Commission's perform-
ance of its official duties and will be resisted); id. § 4.2 at 6 (compensation for Commis-
sion employees who are directed by subpoena to give expert testimony); CAL. PuB. UTx.
CODE §1759 (only the supreme court has jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul
any order or decision of the Commission).
215. E.g., Temescal Water Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d 90, 280 P.2d
1 (1955); Abelleira v. Dist Ct. of Appeals, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 109 P.2d 942 (1941).
216. E.g., Hesperia Land Dev. Co. v. Super. Ct., 184 Cal. App. 2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1969).
217. E.g., Martino v. Concord Community Hosp. Dist., 233 Cal. App. 2d 51, 43
Cal. Rptr. 255 (1965).
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Public Utilities Commission, even though they may be lengthy and
expensive.
There is, however, a judicially-created exception to this general rule
that could possibly apply to the Records Act. In Scripps Memorial
Hospital, Inc. v. California Employment Commission,218 the California
Supreme Court was presented with an act containing remedial provi-
sions very similar to those of the Records Act: both acts authorized, but
did not require, the adoption of administrative procedures, and both acts
unequivocally created a judicial remedy. The Scripps court held that the
California Unemployment Insurance Act219 did not require the exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies, even though the Employment Commis-
sion had exercised its statutory authority by adopting such proce-
dures.2  The court stated that these remedies were neither exclusive nor
mandatory because the Unemployment Insurance Act had expressly
provided a judicial remedy without qualification.2 21 The court further
held that even if the act could be construed as requiring the establish-
ment of administrative remedies, such remedies would only be an alter-
native to the expressly provided judicial remedy222 and, therefore, an
individual could elect between pursuing his administrative or judicial
remedies.
2 28
It is contended that the Scripps analysis of the Unemployment Insur-
ance Act is applicable to the Records Act. First, as previously noted,
Government Code Section 6253(a) authorizes the agencies to develop
inspection procedures, but does not direct the establishment of appellate
procedures. Therefore, as under the Unemployment Insurance Act, the
agencies have discretion to adopt these procedures but are not required
to do so. Secondly, Government Code Sections 6258 and 6259 contain
no indication that administrative remedies must be exhausted before
resorting to the courts. Section 6258 provides, in part: "Any person may
institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative relief in any court of
competent jurisdiction to enforce his right to inspect or to receive a copy
of any public record or class of public records . ". .., Thus, as in the
Scripps case, the Records Act provides for judicial remedies without any
qualifications as to the availability of administrative remedies.
218. 24 Cal. 2d 669, 673-74, 151 P.2d 109, 112 (1944).
219. As amended, CAL. STATS. 1935, c. 352; CAL. STArs. 1939, c. 628, 630.
220. 24 Cal. 2d 669, 674, 151 P.2d 109, 112 (1944).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. However, if an individual elects to pursue his administrative remedies then he
must exhaust them. City of Susanville v. Leo C. Hess Co., 45 Cal. 2d 684, 689, 290
P.2d 520, 523 (1955).
224. CAL. GoV'T CoDE §6258.
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In light of these factors, it seems unlikely that the legislature intended
to impose upon the individual who is denied access to public records the
burden of having to exhaust his available administrative remedies.
Therefore, once an individual is initially refused access to a record by an
agency official it would appear that he can apply to the courts for relief
if he believes that the record is not exempt under the Act.
C. Editing
A second question which arises under the Records Act relates to the
power of the courts to order an agency to "edit" public records. Although
there are no express provisions in the Records Act authorizing this prac-
tice,225 some of the federal courts have intepreted the FOIA to allow the
courts to order agencies to "edit" out exempt material from a record and
disclose the non-exempt portions. 2 6 In this way the policy of maximum
disclosure is preserved by permitting an individual to inspect the sub-
stance of a document that would otherwise be exempt. One commenta-
tor has criticized this editing practice because it places a considerable
burden on agency personnel.2 2 7 In order to edit a record properly, a
public servant would have to have a comprehensive knowledge of the
disclosure laws. Thus, by virtue of this requirement, the ministerial task
of disclosing or refusing to disclose a public record may be transformed
into the complex task of ascertaining which material within a particular
record falls within an exemption and of excising that material. As a
result, higher-level agency officials may often be required to edit the
documents that lower-level employees are incompetent to handle.228
Obviously, this practice has both positive and negative aspects. On the
one hand, it promotes the public's right to know by providing for
maximum disclosure of non-exempt material. On the other hand, ad-
ministrative efficiency may be sacrificed if the agencies are forced to
devote an inordinate amount of time and manpower to a task that
225. There is authority in California that the trial court may edit documents where
appropriate. In re Waltrues, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 223-24, 397 P.2d 1001, 1004, 42 Cal. Rptr.
9, 12 (1965); Terzian v. Super. Ct., 10 Cal. App. 3d 286, 297, 88 Cal. Rptr. 806, 814-
15 (1970).
226. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see Comment, The "In-
vestigatory Files" Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 1974 WAsH. U.L.Q.
463, 470 & n.40 (1974) (cases cited in n.40). In addition, 5 U.S.C. §552(b) of the
FOIA has been amended to require that "any reasonable segregable portion" of a record
be disclosed after exempt portions are deleted. 88 STATS. 1564 (1975).
227. Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions For Making Information
Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. Rav. 189 (1972) (Koch is an attorney in the Office
of the General Council, Federal Trade Commission).
228. See Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions For Making In-
formation Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REv. 189, 203-05, 213 (1972); Bristol-
Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Sapp. 745, 747 (D.D.C. 1968), modified, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
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should be essentially ministerial in nature. Therefore, if the Records Act
should be amended to allow for this practice, or if the courts should take
it upon themselves to institute such a procedure, it would seem that the
agencies should only be required to edit documents that, for the most
part, contain non-exempt material. Documents that contain a substantial
amount of exempt information should be entirely exempt in order to
prevent editing from becoming a burdensome task.
CONCLUSION
The California Public Records Act is an important step forward in
the direction of providing the citizenry with the information it must have
in order to intelligently oversee the bureaucracy which serves it. Al-
though the Act has not completely removed the barriers which prevent
public disclosure of governmental information, it has clarified the scope
of the public's right to inspect by eliminating any conditions based upon
the character or qualifications of the party seeking access and by enact-
ing several discrete exemptions. On the other hand, while the Act has
attempted to clarify the public's right of access, some of its exemptive
provisions contain language which creates uncertainties as to their in-
tended scope and operation. Until the judiciary has explicitly and consis-
tently construed these ambiguous provisions, the ultimate goal of the
Records Act will remain unfulfilled. Hopefully, the analysis presented
here will provide some aid to the public, the agencies, and the courts in
determining the ultimate extent of the public's right of access to public
records.
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